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1979 
TRENDS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 
This preliminary version of the Economic Survey of Latin America, 1979 is being 
distributed in 27 separate parts: an Introduction of a general nature, bearing 
the symbol E/CEPAL/R.227, and 26 Addenda to this document, each containing a 
study of the economic development of a country of the region. These Addenda will 
not appear in alphabetical order, but in order of completion. The complete Survey 
will be published in the usual printed version when the comments arising out of 
this preliminary version have been collected. 




TRENDS I N THE WORLD ECONOMY 
I . THE INTERNATIONAL S E T T I N G 
B e f o r e e x a m i n i n g t h e e c o n o m i c s i t u a t i o n i n L a t i n A m e r i c a i n 1 9 7 9 , a n d i n 
o r d e r t o p r o v i d e a g l o b a l f r a m e w o r k f o r t h e s u b s e q u e n t a n a l y s i s , i t i s d e s i r a b l e 
t o r e v i e w b r i e f l y w o r l d e c o n o m i c t r e n d s d u r i n g t h a t y e a r . T h e r e v i e w w i l l c o v e r 
t r e n d s i n e c o n o m i c g r o w t h , i n f l a t i o n , i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e a n d e x t e r n a l f i n a n c i n g 
i n t h e i n d u s t r i a l i z e d c o u n t r i e s , t h e c e n t r a l l y - p l a n n e d e c o n o m i e s a n d t h e o i l -
e j q p o r t i n g a n d n o n - o i l - e x p o r t i n g d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s . 
1 . O u t p u t 
I n r e c e n t y e a r s t h e w o r l d e c o n o m y h a s u n d e r g o n e a s l o w d o w n i n e c o n o m i c 
g r o w t h a f t e r t h e p r o l o n g e d p e r i o d o f i m p r e s s i v e e x p a n s i o n o n w h i c h f o l l o w e d t h e 
S e c o n d W o r l d W a r . A s may b e s e e n f r o m t a b l e 1 , g r o w t h r a t e s o f w o r l d p r o d u c t i o n 
s i n c e 1 9 7 4 h a v e b e e n c o n s i d e r a b l y l o w e r t h a n t h e a v e r a g e a n n u a l r a t e o f 6 . 1 % 
a c h i e v e d i n t h e p e r i o d 1 9 6 3 - 1 9 7 3 . T h i s s l u g g i s h p e r f o r m a n c e i s o b v i o u è l y 
a t t r i b u t a b l e i n p a r t t o t h e e c o n o m i c d i s l o c a t i o n s , i n f l a t i o n a n d u n c e r t a i n t i e s 
g e n e r a t e d b y t h e d r a m a t i c a l l y h i g h e r e n e r g y c o s t s c a u s e d b y r e c e n t OPEC p r i c i n g 
p o l i c i e s . H o w e v e r , t h e r e a l s o a p p e a r t o b e b r o a d e r s t r u c t u r a l m a l a d j u s t m e n t s 
w h i c h a r e c o n t r i b u t i n g t o t h e g e n e r a l m a l a i s e o f t h è w o r l d e c o n o m y . 
Many o f t h e s e s t r u c t u r a l d i f f i c u l t i e s a r e c l e a r l y m a n i f e s t i n t h e 
i n d u s t r i a l i z e d c o u n t r i e s - t r a d i t i o n a l l y t h e m o t o r o f w o r l d g r o w t h - w h e r e 
t h e r e w e r e s i g n s o f l a g g i n g p r o f i t s , s l u g g i s h f i x e d c a p i t a l f o r m a t i o n a n d g r o w t h 
i n l a b o u r p r o d u c t i v i t y , a n d e x c e s s c a p a c i t y i n k e y i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r s e v e n 
b e f o r e t h e a d v e n t o f t h e h i g h e r p e t r o l e u m p r i c e s f i x e d b y 0 P E C . 1 / I n d e e d , 
i n r e c e n t y e a r s a n e w s c h o o l o f e c o n o m i c t h o u g h t h a s e v o l v e d w h i c h f o c u s e s 
o n t h e " s u p p l y s i d e " o f t h e w o r l d e c o n o m y . T h u s , o n . t h e d o m e s t i c f r o n t 
a t t e n t i o n h a s b e e n g i v e n t o , a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s , i n v e s t m e n t a n d p r o d u c t i v i t y 
a n d t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f c o n s i d e r a b l e c h a n g e s i n r e l a t i v e p r i c e s d u e t o m o r e 
c o s t l y e n e r g y ; i n c r e a s i n g l y s t r i c t r e g u l a t i o n s f o r s a f e t y a n d e n v i r o n m e n t a l 
p r o t e c t i o n ; r e d u c e d l a b o u r m o b i l i t y ; a f o r m o f i n d u s t r i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n 
w h i c h f a c i l i t a t e s t h e p a s s i n g - o n o f c o s t s t h r o u g h w a g e - p r i c e s p i r a l s , e t c . 
1 / S e e t h e B a n k f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e t t l e m e n t s ( B I S ) A n n u a l R e p o r t , J u n e 1 9 7 8 , 
p . 8 . T h e B I S , i n c i d e n t a l l y , h a s g o n e s o f a r a s t o s u g g e s t t h a t t h e w o r l d 
e c o n o u i y may h a v e e n t e r e d i n t o a Kon d r a t i e f f - t y p e s l o w d o w n a f t e r a 
p r o l o n g e d u p w a r d c y c l e o f e c o n o m i c a c t i v i t y . 
/ M o r e o v e r , t h e s e 
- 2 -
Moreover, these structural factors appear to have made the industrialized 
economies more sensitive to inflationary pressures at all levels of 
economic stimulus. Meanwhile, on the international front, concern has 
been expresssed about rigidities in the supply of major raw materials 
which seem likely to cause spiralling commodity prices whenever there is 
any significant recovery of activity in the OECD area. 
The structural nature of the current economic slowdown is further 
suggested by the fact that the economies of the industrialized 
countries have found themselves under continual inflationary pressures 
despite relatively low rates of economic growth, relatively high rates of 
unemployment (see tables 2 and 3), and a respite from further real increases 
in the cost of petroleum in the period 1975-1978.2/ These pressures, in 
their turn, have led to cautious economic management and a general reluctance 
to reflate economies to; "normal" levels of activity. 
By their very nature these problems on the supply side are not quickly 
surmounted. Moreover, some of the structural phenomena are associated 
with the quest for a higher quality, of life - this is most evident in the 
case of safety and environmental protection - and therefore social 
aspects may very well be considered more important than some of the 
apparent private costs associated with the economic slowdown. All this 
means that the sluggish growth seen in the OECD area may not be merely a 
temporary condition. 
In 1979 it appears that the economic growth rate of the industrialized 
economies slipped below the 3.9% recorded in 1978 (see table 2). Much of 
this slippage can be attributed to the "shock" and loss of purchasing power 
derived from another major round of petroleum price rises. Reflecting 
tight supply conditions due to production outbacks in Iran and Nigeria, 
coupled with a rush by consumers to build up oil stocks, the nominal 
official price of petroleum nearly doubled over the 12-month period ending 
2/ In constant 1978 dollars Saudi Arabian oil fell from a peak price of 
14.49 dollars per barrel in 1974 to 12.70 dollars per barrel in 1978. 
See World Bank, Commodity trade and price trends, August 1979, p. 94 
/in December 
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in December 1979,3/ while prices in spot markets, to which many countries had 
to have recourse, rose even more dramatically.4/ 
A further depressant on economic growth in the centre was the sharp rise 
in the domestic interest rates of many countries, especially the United States, 
Germany and the United Kingdom (see table 4), as a result of efforts by monetary 
authorities to contain growing inflationary pressures through tighter control 
over monetary expansion. Interest rate policies were also undoubtedly a desire 
to support domestic currencies influenced by and/or "defensive instincts" aimed 
at forestalling the flight of capital to higher interest rate areas. In 
general, tight monetary policy was complemented by growing firmness in fiscal 
matters: indeed, preliminary estimates by the OECD suggest that the impact of 
public expenditure on GNP growth in 1979 was at one of its lowest levels in 
recent history. 
Among -tiie large economies, the biggest slowdowns in growth were observed 
in the United States and the United Kingdom. The relatively strong level of 
economic activity in the United States finally showed signs of tapering off in 
late 1979 despite very buoyant consumer expenditures. Unlike 1974/1975, when the 
pace of growth in most major countries was "synchronized" and national economies 
entered into recession together, in 1979 two major economies - Germany and 
Japan - contradicted trends in the United States and the United Kingdom by 
accelerating their economic growth. In both countries, private non-residential 
investment, especially in equipment, has been an important source of economic 
stimulus. Exports also have stimulated growth. 
In the centrally planned economies, estimates of the growth of the 
material product (which excludes services) indicate a falling off in the 
rate of economic expansion for the second consecutive year. The growth 
of the material product in 1978 is estimated to have been only 4% - the 
lowest rate realized since the end of World War II - and in 1979 the figure 
3/ Prices of Saudi Arabian Light-34 crude, as quoted in Petroleum 
Intelligence Weekly, Special Supplement of 3 March 1980, p. 3. 
Uf For instance, while the official price of Saudi Arabian Light crude 
was 24 dollars in November 1979, prices on spot markets were as high 
as 40 dollars. See Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 3 December 1979, 
p. 7. 
/was somewhat 
was somewhat below this mark. A primary factor in this sluggish growth 
has been the poor performance of agriculture, but the pace of industrial 
expansion also has waned with respect to previous years .j>/ 
2. Inflation 
One of the main manifestations of the malaise of the. world economy 
has been the unusually high rates of inflation recorded in most industrialized 
countries, and this problem appears to have got worse in 1979. 
Thus, inflation in the industrialized areas rose to an estimated 
8.5% during the year, thereby reversing a trend which witnessed some modest 
improvement in the inflationary picture in 1976-1978 (see table 5). Rising 
oil prices, coupled with the upward movement of some non-oil commodity 
prices, were the main causes of this new inflationary spiral, to which 
higher unit labour costs and the ability of firms to pass the effects of 
more expensive inputs on to their consumers also contributed. 
Of course, there was considerable variation between the rates of 
inflation of the different countries. Among the major industrialized nations 
the United Kingdom and the United States displayed the largest absolute 
deterioration in price stability with respect to 1978, and the United States 
reached its highest level of inflation in the post World War II period. On the 
other side of the spectrum Germany and Japan showed the least intensive 
inflationary situations. Regardless of the performance of individual countries, 
however, there was an almost universal preoccupation with price movements, and 
throughout the OECD area governments were introducing measures to restrain 
monetary and fiscal pressures on domestic price levels and structures. 
Exchange rate movements also undoubtedly influenced the inflationary 
trends in the industrialized countries. As may be seen from figure 1, 
Germant's price performance has been aided by an increasingly strong Deutsche 
Mark, and until 1979 currency strength was also a favourable factor in price 
behaviour in Japan. The United States currency, on the other hand, has 
seriously lost position vis-a-vis the currencies of America's main trading 
partners, and this has undoubtedly contributed to inflationary pressures. 




REAL RELATIVE VALUE OF CURRENCIES OF SELECTED 
INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIESa 
(Index: March 1973 = 100) 
March 
Source: Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., World Financial Markets, December 1978, October 1979, January 1980. 
aMeasure of currency's trade weighted average appreciation or depreciation vis-à-vis currencies of 15 other 




The pound sterling for its part, has shown remarkable strength since 1976, 
and this has presumably assuaged the otherwise virulent domestic 
inflation. 
3. Trade 
In 1979 the value of world trade increased by some 25%, compared with 
16% in 1978 and an annual average of 14% for the period 1964-1973. More 
than two-thirds of the increase in world trade was due to rising world 
prices, as the volume of trade rose only 7%, i.e., much less than its 
value. This rise in volume was less than the historical rate of 8.7% 
recorded in 1964-1973, but substantially higher than the increases realized 
in 1977 and 1978 (see table 6). Trade in 1979 was especially stimulated 
by the shortfalls in agricultural production in the centrally planned 
economies and some developing countries, which made necessary cross-border 
compensatory purchases of grains, food and related items. 
When trade flows are viewed from the standpoint of country groups 
(see table 7), it is seen that there was considerable deterioration in the 
trading position of the industrialized countries, a dramatic improvement 
in the position of the oil exporters, and only a slight erosion of the 
trade accounts of the non-oil-exporting developing countries.6/ 
In 1979 the trade deficit of the OECD area more than doubled, 
reflecting the fact that the value of imports rose by 27% while that of 
exports grew by only 23%. In the years immediately following the 1973/1974 
oil price increases, the industrialized countries rapidly increased the 
volume of their exports to the oil-producing countries and thus bolstered 
their trade position, but the rate of growth of these exports slipped from 
15% in 1977 to only 4.5% in 1978, and it is estimated that the volume 
actually fell by some 11% in 1979. A slowdown was also apparent in 1979 
in the growth of the volume of their exports to the non-oil-exporting 
developing countries, which have also been an important market for OECD 
products. The only area where there was an increased volume of exports was 
within the OECD itself. 
6/ No data are available for the centrally planned economies. 
/As for 
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As for the import volume of the OECD countries, this rose by nearly 8% 
compared with 5% in 1977, stimulated by the fact that many countries vigorously 
stockpiled raw materials. Imports from the oil-producing countries increased by 
about 2%, while those from the non-oil-exporting developing countries 
rose by some 8.5%. 
The faster growth in the volume of imports as compared to exports 
was aggravated by a roughly 4% deterioration in the terms of trade, which 
basically reflects the very sharp rises in petroleum prices and, to a 
lesser extent, improvements in the prices of some primary commodities 
with respect to 1978. 
The stronger trade position of the oil exporters was, of course, 
fundamentally due to the notable rise in petroleum prices in 1979, but 
the volume of their exports also grew slightly with respect to 1978. 
Another factor behind the oil exporters trade surplus iri 1979 was the 
aforementioned decline in import volume, which was only partially offset 
by higher unit prices. Imports have recently been restrained by some oil 
exporters because of growing budgetary constraints that were relieved 
only during the course of 1979. Moreover, some countries have restrained 
expenditures and imports because of concern over the potentially socially 
destabilizing effects of very rapid and uncontrolled growth. Finally, 
social disruption in Iran in 1979 hampered sales to this market and 
was a major factor in the absolute fall in the volume of imports by 
the oil-producing countries that year. 
In spite of the increase in petroleum prices, the non-oil-exporting 
developing countries showed only a modest deterioration in their trade position 
due to strong export growth (see table 7). Volume,, as in the past couple of 
years, continued to increase strongly, by an estimated 8%a and unit prices were 
aided by a sharp recovery in the quotations for non-oii primary commodities. The 
volume of their imports grew at a slightly slower pace than that of exports, 
but unit prices rose faster than those for exports, causing an estimated 
1-2% decline in the terms of trade with respect to 1978 (see table 8). 
/It is 
8 
It is important to stress that the non-oil-exporting developing 
' countries have had to meet a formidable challenge in order to keep their 
trade accounts in reasonable shape. Unlike the OECD countries, they 
are not in a good position (except perhaps in the case of semi-industrialized 
countries such as Brazil, Korea, Taiwan, etc.), to capture a large share of 
OPEC trade, where manufactures play an important role. Their traditional 
markets are in the OECD countries, but these have experienced relatively 
slow growth. Nevertheless, export growth for the developing countries as 
a whole has been suprisingly strong due to gains in both volume and prices. 
The buoyant volume is accounted for in part by the intensive export 
campaigns carried on by many countries, which have included more South-South 
trade. Speculative stockbuilding by the industrialized countries has also 
periodically aided certain exporters of ferrous and non-ferrous metals. 
Prices, for their part, have risen in response to general world inflation, 
periodic speculative demand, and production shortfalls in certain 
commodities, the most notable being coffee. Price movements, however, 
while strong, have generally not kept up with the increasing costs of 
manufactured products from the industrialized countries (see table 8). 
4. The current account of the balance of payments 
In 1978, for the first time since 1973, the current account balance 
of the world economy approached levels close to the traditional relation-
ships between industrialized and developing countries, thus reflecting 
an adjustment that was much more rapid than many had envisioned at the 
time of the 1973/1974 oil crisis. As may be seen from table 9, by 1978 
the industrialized countries had returned to a sizeable surplus position, 
• the oil exporters' surplus position had virtually evaporated, and the 
non-oil-exporting developing countries maintained their customary deficit, 
although in nominal terms this remained considerably higher than its 
pre-1974 level. Thus, roughly speaking the world economy appeared to be 
well on the road to completing the so-called adjustment of external 
positions following the oil price shocks of 1973/1974. However, further 
progress was not to be achieved, as the renewed round of oil price 




In 1979, the industrialized countries saw their joint current account 
position deteriorate to a deficit of roughly 9 billion dollars: a slump 
of 37 billion dollars with respect to 1978. The major industrialized 
countries which experienced the strongest deterioration of their current 
account positions were Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom, all of which 
went from surplus to deficit positions. Japan slipped from a surplus of 
17 billion dollars in 1978 to ,a deficit of nearly 8 billion dollars in 1979; 
the shift for Germany over the same period was from a 9 billion dollar 
surplus to a 1 billion dollar deficit,, and that for the United Kingdom was 
from a 2 billion dollar surplus to a 6 billion dollar deficit. On the 
other hand, the United States current account position improved, with 
the deficit falling from 14 billion dollars to 3 billion between 1978 
and 1979.2/ 
Most of the drain of income from the industrialized countries went 
directly to the oil exporters, which experienced a tenfold rise in their 
surplus to 60 billion dollars - only slightly less than the figure recorded 
in 1974 (see table 9). In real terms, of course, the increase was less 
than in 1974, but nevertheless the magnitude of the shift in resource flows 
was very substantial, affecting in dramatic fashion not only world financing 
requirements but also expectations. 
The oil producers' surplus also had its counterpart in a deterioration 
of the current accounts of the non-oil-exporting developing countries. 
However, unlike the industrialized countries which went from a large surplus 
to a modest deficit, the non-oil-exporting developing countries went from 
an already sizeable deficit of 31 billion dollars to a massive 50 billion 
dollar deficit (see table 9). Thus, the current account deficits of the 
countries of this group, which in 1976-1978 had been brought down to what 
were generally termed manageable levels, in 1979 were inflated to proportions 
that once again made them a source of preoccupation for the world community. 
7/ Data in this paragraph are from OECD, Economic Outlook, No. 26, 
December 1973, p. 62. 
/At the 
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At the root of this concern has been the fear that this time the oil 
producers' surplus will remain high and perhaps even grow larger, thus 
placing continued and severe pressure on the external positions of the 
world economy in general and the non-oil-exporting developing countries 
in particular. 
It is true that the oil producers' surplus of 1974 was whittled 
down much faster than most had anticipated because of the surprising 
capacity of absorption displayed by many producers and because supply and 
demand conditions generated a temporary inability on the part of the oil 
cartel to cover inflation with compensatory adjustments in petroleum prices. 
But the post-1979 period could present new problems and new challenges. 
On the one hand, some are concerned that the absorptive capacity of many 
oil producers may not be as buoyant as after the last round of price 
hikes because, among other reasons, there seems to be a new awareness 
on the part of some producers of the apparent social and political disruption 
that can be experienced when there is a massive surge in expenditures for 
development. On the other hand, any desire on the part of major producers 
for a strategy that entails a slower, more deliberate pace of development will 
provide less incentive to bring petroleum out of the ground, and over the 
short to medium term this could give rise to further increases in oil prices. 
The picture is further clouded by the uncertainty over whether current 
account deficits in the non-oil-exporting developing countries of a 
magnitude similar to, or larger than, that of 1979 can continue to be 
financed. 
5. External finance 
The very substantial rise observed in 1979 in the deficits of the 
industrialized countries and the non-oil-exporting developing countries 
is indeed dramatic, but represents the only logical response to the shock 
provided by higher oil prices. The alternative, involving policies designed 
to impose much greater restraint on the expansion of current account 
balances, implies high costs in terms of world economic activity. Moreover, 
for developing countries it would involve unacceptable setbacks to 
development and perhaps intensification of social and political unrest. 
/Put in 
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Put in this perspective, the bloated current account deficits of 1979 
can simply be viewed as an "escape valve" that permits the world economy 
to avoid much greater evils. 
The other side of the coin with respect to the current account 
balances is the availability of external finance which make such deficits 
possible. Indeed, since the oil crisis of 1974 the issue of finance has 
been and continues to be the main factor in securing relatively smooth 
adjustment in the world economy. External financing has enabled current 
account deficits in non-oil developing countries to be offset 
gradually, thus helping governments to avoid radical and disruptive 
adjustments; indeed, the maintenance of reasonable (although not wholly 
satisfactory) growth rates in developing areas has been closely linked 
to the possibility for finance and debt accumulation. If in the future 
adequate finance were not available, it would not be possible to maintain 
the non-oil developing countries1 current deficits, and this in turn could 
have serious implications for growth in these countries as well as for the 
industrialized countries that have benefited from the stimulus provided 
by the import demand of the Third World; 
In recent years international commercial banks have been financing 
about one-third of the current account deficit of the non-oil-exporting 
developing countries, compared with only 19% at the beginning of the decade.J3/ 
For middle-income countries like those of Latin America, however, the 
reliance on commercial bank debt has been much more pronounced, with 
around 50% of "the deficit being covered by banks (the corresponding 
figure was only 12% in 1966-1970).9/ Indeed, table 10 shows that 
Latin America has accounted roughly for two-thirds of the gross 
obligations of the non-oil-exporting developing countries to the banks, 
while on a net basis Latin America accounts for virtually all of that debt. 
8/ See P.' Watson» Debt and Developing Countries; Mew Problems and New 
Actors,.Washington, D.C., Overseas Development Council, Development 
Paper No. 26, 1978, pp. 12-13. 
9/ See C. Massad, "Latin America and the International Monetary System: 
Some Comments and Suggestions", CEPAL Review, No. 10, April 1980. 
/Although much 
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Although much of Latin America'? indebtedness to the banks relates to 
two superborrowers, Brazil and Mexico, other countries such as Peru, 
Argentina, Colombia, Jamaica, Panama, etc., have also accumulated important 
debts with these institutions... . . 
Table 11 shows the evolution of borrowing by developing and 
industrialized countries in the Eurocurrency market. It can be seen that 
the non-oil-exporting developing countries have accounted for roughly 
one-third of the total publicized Eurocre.dits from, private commercial banks. 
The rate of growth of credit has been quite spectacular, with the value 
of loans almost doubling between 1974 and 197.7 and.then roughly doubling 
again between 1977 and 1978/1979. Borrowing by oil producers, which until 
recently were encountering what for them constituted tight budgetary 
conditions, has also risen sharply recently. , The growth of lending to 
industrialized countries had, been much less spectacular, partly because 
this latter groip has had considerable recourse, to private bond markets 
- a source of finance.that the non-oil-exporting developing countries have 
had only modest success in tapping (see table 12). 
(a) Some factors underlying borrowing and lending 
The notable rise in borrowing by the non-oil-exporting developing 
countries in 1978-1979 was due to a number of factors. 
On the.supply side, banks were relatively cautious lenders to LDCs 
in 1975-1977 because of a generally restrictive environment created by 
concern over a series of major bank failures in the second half of 1974 
(related to bad foreign exchange management), as-well as by fear for the 
rising debt burden of many developing countries and the appearance of 
debt crises for a number of important borrowers. However, doubts over 
market stability and general developing country creditworthiness began 
to fade in late 1977 and the banks, under the pressure of rising liquidity, 
showed a much greater disposition to lend to developing countries. Moreover, 
competition among the banks for clients intensified with the re-emergence 
of Japanese institutions (which had virtually withdrawn from the market in 
late 1974) as major lenders and the more aggressive attitude on foreign 
lending assumed by the German banks. The more buoyant attitude of German 
/and Japanese 
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and Japanese lenders was influenced by the strong surplus positions of 
their respective countries' balance of payments, and helped to compensate 
for the more restrictive posture of United States banks, which had been 
extending well over 50% of all loans to developing countries but were now 
nearing the limits of their exposure - both those that are self-imposed 
and those dictated by national regulatory authorities. 
Meanwhile, on the demand side, the non-oil developing countries 
- faced as they were with increasing external pressures in 1978 and again 
in 1979 - were in need of finance to cover their expanding current account 
deficit. Their borrowing was also influenced by a desire to accumulate 
reserves: a phenomenon that was particularly important in 1978 (private 
creditors generally look with favour on large reserve accumulations by 
borrowers). 
One reason for the greater interest in borrowing and reserve 
accumulation was that banks were quite keen to lend and as a result the 
terms of loans had improved markedly over what was offered in the 
restrictive days of 1975-1977. As may be seen from table 13 and 14, there 
was a remarkable lowering of the average spread over LIBOR on loans to 
developing countries in 1978-1979, with over 70% of the loans carrying 
a spread of 1% or less by the second quarter of 1979, in contrast with 
the total absence of loans with such a low spread in 1975 aid 1976. As 
for maturities, these lengthened dramatically, as may be seen from the 
fact that by mid-1979 nearly 70% of all credit to developing countries 
carried maturities of between 7 and 10 years, compared to only between 
3% and 9% of the credit extended in 1975-1977. 
The easing of access to credit, as well as the more favourable terms, 
meant that lending conditions were similar to those available to developing 
countries in 1972-1974. This was undoubtedly a very positive development, 
because the sudden squeeze on credit in 1975 had caused a bunching of 
maturities that seriously complicated debt management for many countries; 
the more recent lowering of interest margins and the lengthening of 
maturities has helped to ease this situation somewhat. 
/(b) Some 
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(b) Some uncertainties 
Despite the improved borrowing environment in 1979, it should be 
noted that - as mentioned earlier - the increased finance requirements of 
non-oil developing countries as a result of the much higher oil prices 
have generated concern about the possibility of continuing to finance theise 
countries' current deficits. 
One of the major reasons underlying this concern is the fact that 
banks must once again assume the main role in recycling surplus receipts 
to deficit countries, and this must be done under conditions in which 
many borrowers are already very much weighed down by the volume of debt 
they have contracted on commercial terms. International banks, of course, 
operate under criteria of private and individual risk and rates of return, 
which may restrict their ability to respond in ways which are fully consonant 
with the broader social requirements of a smoothly functioning world economy. 
As one important international commercial bank has pointed out with 
regard to the ability of banks to meet once again the escalating requirements 
of balance-of-payments finance: "There is no room for complacency in this 
regard just because the banks handled the job so well during the 1970s".10/ 
This institution points out two major obstacles now confronting commercial 
banks. The first is a relatively limited capital base, as many 
Uhited States banks, as wel^. as Japanese and European institutions, 
have seen the expansion of their assets far outstrip the growth of equity 
capital, causing disturbing declines in capital/asset ratios. A second 
j • «' 
major obstacle to the banks is the concentration of portfolio risk. As 
noted earlier, most of the bank lending has been concentrated in middle-income 
developing countries, and within this group, a handful of borrowers have 
captured a high percentage of total lending. Thus the self-imposed 
requirements of risk diversification, and in some cases officially established 
limits on exposure, may inhibit any massive expansion of commercial bank 
lending. 




Aside from the commercial banks' concern about the requirements, 
for finance, there is a growing; body of opinion in development circles 
that the increasing reliance of developing countries'on bank credit may 
have gone beyond desirable levels and that therefore new approaches 
are called for to tackle the foreign resource requirements of these . 
countries. 
The World Bank, in.its 1979 World Development.Report, has. pointed 
out that the. growing role of private banks in finance has caused a marked 
deterioration of the maturity structure of developing country debt* Thus, 
50% of the developing countries' total medium and long-term debt outstanding 
at the end of 1977 was scheduled to be repaid in 5 years, while the 
proportion of private-debt that must be repaid over the same period was 70%.11/ 
As the bank observes, the surge of payments brought on by shorter maturities 
generates ever larger amounts of debts that private creditors must consider 
rolling over, with an ever greater danger that?any "initial changes 
impairing a country's debt situation .could trigger loss of confidence and 
a debt crisis". 12/ 
The recently formulated report of the Brandt Commission goes further 
in raising concern about the high profile of banks in development finance. 
It points out that one of .the major drawbacks of.private loans is that, 
"debtor economies and the entire international credit structure are very, 
vulnerable ; to any disruptions in the flows of capital, which can be 
caused by a greater demand for credit in the North, by a borrowing country 
being regarded as less creditworthy,.by insufficient bank capital, or by 
actions of regulatory authorities".13/ In the Commission's view, the 
heart of the problem with regard to developing countries' heavy reliance on 
commercial debt is that "a very, large proportion of funds are lent on terms ; 
which are onerous for borrowers from the point of view of both the repayment 
capacity of the projects they finance and the time debtor countries need to 
correct structural imbalances in their external accounts".14/ 
11/ World Bank, World Development Report, 1979, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1979, p. 30. 
12/ Ibid. 
13/ Independent Commission on International Development Issues, North-South: 
A programme for survival, London, Pan Books, 1980, p. 223. 
14/ Ibid. ^ —• /Finally, the 
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Finally, the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD has also 
recently urged that much more official finance should be made available, 
pointing to the fact that commercial bank resources have been "expensive, 
and maturities - though lengthened - are still too short to serve well 
either the long-term capital needs of developing countries for major 
industrial and infrastructural investments, or their need to effect 
medium-term balance-of-payments adjustments should their terms of trade 
deteriorate by reason of increases in the price of oil or other essential 
imports".15/ 
Thus, both the commercial banks and important development forums 
are concerned about the current nature of finance to developing countries. 
The major preoccupation of the latter group involve? the stability of 
private credit flows, coupled with the relatively short maturities of such 
credit for development and its sometimes high costs. It may also be added 
that interest costs can be extremely variable (see table 15), thus adding 
another difficult dimension to debt management. 
The evident difficulties in bank finance have given rise to a number 
of proposals for reform. 
Some of the first initiatives have came from developing countries 
themselves. Thus, the problem of the short maturities associated with the 
current world financial system caused the governments of Mexico and 
Venezuela not long ago to make separate proposals regarding mechanisms 
to facilitate access by developing countries to long-term finance 
(see table 16). These proposals essentially envisaged more official 
intermediation of world savings, as funds raised through bond issues and 
official contributions would be administered by the World Bank for the 
purpose of providing massive transfers of resources for projects on terms 
that would be more compatible with the extended gestation period of 
development. Other proposals for large transfers have oome from sources 
such as the OECD and members of the United States Congress. More recently, 
the Brandt Commission has supported massive official transfers to developing 
areas and has urged greater access to bond markets for developing countries. 
15/ OECD, Development Co-operation! 1979 Review, Paris, 1979, p. 91. 
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It has also advocated a new development finance institution that could 
provide untied "programme" loans to developing countries as well as 
finance for South-South trade and minerals development.16/ Furthermore, 
under pressure from developing countries for new and quicker forms of 
financial assistance, the World Bank too is now seriously considering a 
broader facility for "programme" lending to support structural adjustment 
over a medium- to long-term period. 
Another institution which has been under increasing pressure to make 
better arrangements to accomodate developing countries' requirements for 
finance is the International Monetary Fund (IMF). To date, countries have 
avoided the IMF as long as possible because of what they consider to be the 
excessively harsh nature of the stabilization programmes that the Fund designs 
as a condition for its finance. Thus, countries have often preferred bank 
finance to the Fund and have turned to this latter institution only when 
economic conditions have deteriorated to such an extent that the banks have 
refused further financial support. The reluctance of countries to use the Fund 
is partly reflected in the fact that in 1979 the IMF was repaid more than it 
disbursed to member countries (through its General Resources Account) for 
balance-of-payments support.17/ To remedy this problem, many suggestions for 
the reform of the conditions imposed have been placed before the IMF, the 
most comprehensive perhaps being the recently prepared UNDP/UNCTAD Report.18/ 
In 19.79 the IMF made some effort to adjust its policies through the 
introduction of new guidelines regarding the conditions it imposes. Among 
the measures adopted were a commitment to stabilization programmes that are 
longer than the traditional one-year period and a formal commitment by the 
Fund to "pay due regard to the domestic social and political objectives, the 
economic priorities and the circumstances of members, including the causes of 
their balance of payments problems".19/ Thus, the Fund seems to 
16/ Independent Commission ..., op. cit., p. 252. 
17/ See IMF Survey, January 21, 1980. 
18/ See United Nations, The balance-of-payments adjustment process in 
developing countries; Report to the Group of Twenty-fours New York, 
N.Y., UNDP/UNCTAD, Project INT/75/015, 1979. 
19/ See IMF Survey, March 19, 1979. 
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be moving, albeit slowly, in the direction of making itself a more 
attractive source of finance for developing economies, 
(c) Other issues 
Before closing this review of the world economy, there are a 
further three contemporary issues related to finance that should be raised. 
The first relates to the bargaining capacity of developing countries 
vis-a-vis the international banking community. While there are 
encouraging signs that the long-needed boost in the official recycling 
of world surpluses may soon come into effect, at least for the immediate 
future private commercial banks are likely to remain the principal agents 
of finance for middle-income developing countries. Their apparent 
increasing reluctance to play this role is more likely to reflect itself 
in a hardening of terms than in a sharp curtailment of loan volume, 
since the latter would only jeopardize the security of bank assets. 
Thus, with bankers maintaining a very high profile in finance, there is 
a strong argument for seeking measures to enhance borrowing countries' 
access to information about commercial banks, both at the macro level 
as well as in respect of individual institutions. While banks are 
demanding and gaining ever more access to official information about 
developing countries, there is an unfortunate dearth of published data 
on the banks, making it difficult for borrowers (especially inexperienced 
ones) to map out ex-ante borrowing strategies and to decide on suitable 
relationships with individual commercial lenders. This deficiency becomes 
all the more Serious when one takes into account that international banks 
are not homogeneous and can have very distinct modes of behaviour.20/ 
Thus, it would appear that a more concerted effort should be made to develop 
multilateral mechanisms for the detailed study of, and dissemination of 
information on, international banks.21/ 
20/ This is evident from the study by R. Devlin Transnational Banks 
and Their Penetration of the External Finance of the Third World; 
The Experience of Peru, E/CEPAL/L.211, Santiago, Chile, 1979. The 
UN Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) has recently 
published a report on transnational banks that similarly show very 
distinct lending strategies- among the banks. See UNCTC, Transnational 
Banks: Operations Strategies and Their Effects on Developing Countries» 
N.Y., ST/CTC/16, 1980. ! ^ 




A second issue related to finance that is becoming of increasing 
importance for the smooth-running transfer of resources and the adjustment 
process is the need for more adequate formal machinery for debt rescheduling 
and renegotiation. Debt problems are becoming increasingly frequent 
among developing countries, but to date countries in debt crises have 
unfortunately faced an ad hoc renegotiating system that offers few 
guidelines on behaviour for either borrower or lender. Governments 
usually confront "problem" borrowers in the multilateral negotiations 
of the so-called Paris Club, while commercial banks usually form ad hoc 
committees that represent commercial creditors and generally result in some 
form of refinance. The lack of general principles for debt renegotiation 
has meant that' there is often very different treatment of borrowers that 
is not wholly explained by individual repayment capacities and development 
requirements. This has made renegotiation a rather traumatic and 
unpredictable experience for developing countries. Moreover, borrowers 
maintain that the creditors' time horizon is much too short, creating 
repayment periods which are excessively tight and fail to take into account 
the special circumstance of the country. Indeed, the World Bank, in its 
1979 World Development Report, has pointed to this latter problem and 
has made some suggestions. It has been proposed, for example, that the 
creditors grouped together in the Paris Club should negotiate repayment 
according to the economic and development needs of the borrower over some 
medium-term period, to include, where appropriate, concessional terms of 
repayment so as to provide real transfers through debt relief. Contractual 
clauses could allow for adjustment of the terms of repayment should the 
evolution of the borrower's economy differ substantially from that of the 
medium-term projections. The World Bank also emphasizes that commercial 
banks must somehow better co-ordinate their negotiations with those of the 
Paris Club so as to avoid the confusion, long delays and tensions that 
have characterized commercial bank refinance negot iat ions .22/ 
22/ See World Bank (1979), op.cit., p. 33. 
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The third and last issue related to finance reflects the fact 
that debt cannot be viewed in isolation from trade. Developing countries 
need access to the markets of the industrialized countries in order to 
generate the escorts to repay their external obligations.23/ Thus, 
protectionism in the industrialized countries is self-defeating, generating 
a greater need for debt while at the same time reducing the means for 
repayment of that debt. Clearly, if countries are to maintain their 
repayment capacity, protectionism must be avoided. Indeed, liberalization 
of markets would seem to be a useful way to relieve the burdèn imposed 
by the developing countries' external obligations and at the same time 
give industrialized countries opportunities to lower their domestic 
rates of inflation through access to less expensive Third World goods. 
23/ The importance of the relationship between debt servicing capacity 
and exports is clearly presented in a recent study by Pierre Dhonte 
entitled CloCkwork Debt (Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1979). 
/II. AN 
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II. AN OVERVIEW 
In a world economic situation characterized, as has been seen, by a 
slackening of economic growth both in* the industrialized countries and in the 
centrally-planned economies and the chief oil-exporting countries, by the 
accentuation of world inflation, by fresh Steep rises in oil prices, and by 
significant changes in international trade flows and financing, economic 
trends in Latin America were, broadly speaking, relatively favourable. While 
in the course of the year inflation worsened in many countries of the region, 
and although the current account deficit of Latin America as a whole increased 
considerably, in 1979 the growth rate of the total product of the region also 
rose sharply, and the value and volume of Latin American exports continued to 
grow at surprisingly high rates. 
Thus, after four years of mediocre economic growth during which the 
gross domestic product grew by an average of barely 4.3% annually, in 1979 it 
rose by 6.5%. This rate - almost doubled the economic growth rate of the 
group of OECD countries - also meant that for the first time since the 
international crisis of the mid-1970s the per capita product rose by 4%, a 
rate approaching those recorded in the region during the first half of the 
decade, when the Latin American economy grew exceptionally, rapidly and steadily 
(see table 17). 
The ejqpansion of production in the region in 1979 was accompanied by a 
particularly significant growth of trade and financial flows with the rest of 
the world. Despite the lower growth of the central economies in 1979 and the 
resurgence of their protectionist practices, as well as the lower level of 
imports by the OPEC countries, the value of Latin American escorts of goods 
rose by over 33%, well above the growth rate of world exports (25%). As in 
the three previous years, during which exports also grew at quite rapid rates, 
although well below that of 1979, the rise in sales was largely due to greater 
volume. The quantum of escorts rose by nearly 11% for the region as a whole, 
and at an even higher rate for the group of the non-oil-exporting countries. 
/This vigorous 
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This vigorous growth was further strengthened by the substantial rise of 
over 20% in the unit value of exports, as a result of better world prices for 
oil, copper, wood, lead, nickel, meat, Sugar and many other commodities. 
Consequently, and despite the equally pronounced rise (15%) in the unit value 
of imports, the terms of trade rose by nearly 5%, thus partially offsetting 
the sharp drop in the previous year. 
During 1979 the value of imports also rose sharply (26%). Nevertheless, 
while this growth was much greater than in any of the four previous years, it 
was considerably less than that of exports and consequently the deficit in 
trade in goods and services shrank from US$ 5.9 billion in 1978 to US$ 4 
billion in 1979 for the region as a whole. 
However, as a res-ult of a new large rise of over US$ 4 billion in net 
payments of profits and interest on foreign capital, the current account 
deficit once again rose in 1979. It amounted to an unprecedented US$ 18.3 
billion, well above the US$ 16.3 billion in the previous year and the 14.2 
billion of 1975, when the previous international recession came to an end. 
Nevertheless, as in previous years the current account deficit was to 
some extent the result of the abundant inflow of capital to the region. 
During 1979 the net inflow of non-compensatory capital reached the record level 
of nearly US$ 25.5 billion, which made it possible not only to finance the 
deficit on current account but also to increase net international reserves by 
over US$ 7.0 billion (see table 17). 
/III. ECONOMIC 
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III. ECONOMIC GROWTH 
1. The growth rate 
As mentioned earlier, in 1979 the economic growth rate of Latin America rose 
sharply. The gross domestic product of the region grew by 6.5%, double the scant 
growth recorded in 1975 at the end of the international crisis, and also well above 
the stable but mediocre growth rate of the economy in the .following three years. 
Furthermore, since in 1979 the terms of trade improved, the rise in gross incone 
was slightly higher than the growth of the product. 
Unlike what happened in previous years, the faster growth of the product in 
1979 was primarily the result of the greater dynamism of most of the larger 
economies or countries with the highest per capita income in the region. Thus, the 
domestic product rose by about 8.5% in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, 8% in Mexico 
and 6.4% in Brazil. For the third consecutive year, Paraguay was the country 
whose economy grew fastest (9%) (see table 18). 
On the other hand, the growth of the product varied between a little tinder 
4% and a little over 5% in the Andean Pact economies - with the exception of 
Bolivia, where total economic growth barely amounted to 1.5% - and the Central 
American countries, with the exception of El Salvador and Nicaragua, where the 
product dropped in absolute terms primarily as a result of the socio-political 
events which disrupted normal production activity. Finally, growth was very weak 
in most of the Caribbean economies. In the Dominican Republic and Cuba growth 
rates were 3.6 and 2.4% respectively, while in Haiti the product rose by less than 
2%, and in Jamaica it apparently declined for the seventh consecutive year (see 
table 18). 
Despite their striking similarity, the causes and significance of the high 
growth rates of the total product in the countries of the extreme south of the 
region were very different. Thus, in Argentina, where economic activity increased 
more rapidly in 1979 than in any of the ten previous years, the growth of the 
product largely represented an upturn after the decline in 1978 as a result of 
which, following the drops in production in 1975 and 1976, the per capita product 
in 1978 was scarcely above the level achieved 5 years earlier. 
The situation was similar, although more favourable, in Chile. The sharp 
growth of the product in 1979 meant that for the second consecutive year the 
economy enjoyed genuine growth, after recovering in 1977 the level of activity 
achieved in 1974, which had dropped sharply in the following year. Nevertheless, 
due to the growth of the population and the slow and uneven growth of the economy 
in 1972-1976, the per capita product in 1979 was only slightly (4%) above the 
maximum level achieved in 1971. ._. /The significance 
The significance of the 8.4% growth in the total product of Uruguay was 
quite different. The expansion in 1979 represented a sharp accentuation of 
the moderate but steady growth of the Uruguayan economy since 1975, following 
20 years of virtual stagnation.24/ As a result of that growth, combined 
with a very weak demographic growth rate, the per capita product in 1979 was 
almost 22% above the 1974 level. 
The continuity and, above all,, the strength of the growth process 
were even more pronounced in Paraguay. Following an annual average rate of 
6.4% in the period 1970-1976, and the exceptionally high rate of 11% in the 
next two years, total economic activity expanded by 9% in 1979, thus almost 
doubling the level of the beginning of the decade. As a result of this 
extraordinary growth, generated primarily by the construction of the huge 
Itaipu hydroelectricity dam and the strong growth and diversification of the 
agricultural sector, and despite the rapid growth of the population, the 
per capita product rose by 23% over the last three year«, and in 1979 was 50% 
above the 1970 figure (see table 19). 
During 1979 the growth rates of Brazil and Mexico, by far the largest 
economies of the region, also rose.25/ The greater dynamism was particularly . 
pronounced in Mexico, where the product rose by 8% following a 7% rise in 
1978, thus ending the situation of stagnation which had prevailed in 1976-
1977. In the consolidation of this new stage of growth of the Mexican 
economy, a major role was played by the petroleum industry, which grew at a 
rate of about 15% for the third consecutive year, while oil exports more than 
doubled in 1979, generating more than 40% of foreign exchange earnings from 
exports of goods. 
On the other hand, the considerable rise in world oil prices hampered 
the growth of the Brazilian economy, which in 1979 had to devote nearly 50% 
more resources than in 1978 to imports of fuels and lubricants: these accounted 
for 37% of the total value of imports of goods. Nevertheless, and despite ; 
24/ A telling sign of this extremely.unfavourable situation is that the 
per capita product in 1975 was the same as the average for the four-
year period 1954-1957. 
25/ In 1979, these two countries accounted for one-third and one-quarter 
of the total product of Latin America, respectively. 
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the restrictive economic policy applied in the first half of the year, the 
product grew by 6.4%. This rate was slightly above that of 1978, and the 
same as the average for the period 1975-1977, but well below the extraordinarily 
high annual rate of 11.5% achieved during the first half of the decade, when 
the stage of strong, sustained growth begun by the Brazilian economy in 1968 
reached a peak. 
The rapid growth rate achieved in most of the larger Latin American 
economies and countries with higher per capita income levels naturally meant 
that in most of the other countries the product rose at a rate below the 
regional average. 
Of the thirteen economies in this group, Colombia and Ecuador had the 
highest growth rates; their gross domestic product increased by slightly 
over 5%. 
In Colombia, the growth of the economy was much smaller than in 1978, 
when it had reached the record level of nearly 9%, but above the stable, 
moderate rate for the period 1975-1977. The lower growth rate recorded in 
1979 was the result of more moderate growth in most production sectors, 
partly stemming from the restrictive monetary and public investment policies 
applied by the Government in order to combat inflation; but the decisive 
factor was the smaller growth of the agricultural sector. This sector, which 
still generates over one-quarter of the total product of Colombia, having 
enjoyed an exceptionally high rate of 9% in 1978, grew by less than 5% in 
1979, primarily as a result of the much smaller relative growth of coffee 
production. 
The growth of economic activity was also relatively satisfactory in 
Ecuador, where the domestic product rose by 5.4% for the second consecutive 
year, after having grown strongly and steadily over the eight previous years, 
during which it expanded by almost 83%. The slower growth of production in 
1979 occurred despite the appreciable improvement in the terms of trade and the 
40% rise in the value of exports, primarily because of the doubling of oil 
prices. However, the favourable effects of the higher price of oil, which 
in 1979 accounted for nearly 50% of earnings from exports of goods, were 
partially wiped out by the disappointing results achieved in agriculture, 
which was hit by drought for the third consecutive year, and in construction, 
where growth rates dropped sharply. 
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As in Ecuador, the new sharp rises in world oil prices greatly 
benefited Venezuela, the value of whose exports rose by nearly 52%, while 
the terms of trade improved by over 36%, thus rising by nearly 260% in the 
course of the decade. Despite these favourable factors, the growth rate of 
the product declined in 1979 for the third consecutive year, and barely 
exceeded 4%. In contrast with earlier years, this moderate growth was 
basically generated by the expansion of the petroleum and mining sectors, 
both of which are fundamentally linked with exports and both sectors where 
production had declined systematically since 1974. On the other hand, there 
was a sharp drop in the growth rate of sectors oriented towards the 
satisfaction of domestic demand, such as manufacturing industry and 
construction, which had grown strongly and steadily until 1977-1978, but 
were affected in 1979 by the restrictive fiscal and monetary policy adopted 
in order to bring inflation under control. 
The exceptional rise of nearly 80% in the value of exports, 
fundamentally resulting from much larger, sales of oil, copper and manufactures, 
accounted for the upturn in economic activity in Peru. Following very low 
growth rates in 1975 and 1976, and slight declines in the following two 
years, the domestic product grew by 84% in 1979. Nevertheless, as a result 
of rapid population growth rates and the virtual stagnation of global 
production in the previous three years, the per capita product in 1979 was 
still 7% below the 1975 figure. 
In Central America, the economic growth rate dropped appreciably. 
Nevertheless, Guatemala, Honduras and to a lesser extent Costa Rica managed 
to increase global production at relatively satisfactory rates ranging from 
5% to a little over 4%, while the growth rate of Panama rose from a little 
under 4% in 1978 to nearly 5% in 1979. However, due to the steady decline 
between 1974 and 1976, the per capita product of Panama in 1979 was still 
below the level achieved in 1973. 
Although the loss of dynamism of the Central American economies was to 
some extent the result of economic policy decisions or natural circumstances 
which affected them all very differently, it also reflected the impact of 
a number of common external factors. Chief among these was the much higher 
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cost of imports in 1979, as a result of the sharp rises in world fuel prices, 
the accentuation of inflation in the industrialized economies, and the 
uncertainty stemming from the political upheavals which affected a large 
number of countries of the subregion, and particularly El Salvador and 
Nicaragua. 
In the former, political and social unrest caused the loss of many lives, 
the destruction of some installations and crops, work stoppages, collective 
disorders and two changes of government during the year, which together 
resulted in a 3% drop in the total product and much , larger declines in 
commerce, industry and construction. 
In Nicaragua, the social disturbances already clearly latent in 1978 led 
to a bloody civil war in 1979, and a radical change of government in July. 
As the war extended to almost all regions of the country during the first 
half of the year, economic activity was progressively paralyzed, the area 
sown to crops declined, stocks of imported raw materials and staple foods 
were virtually exhausted, industrial installations, plant and equipment, 
and means of transport suffered considerable destruction and damage, there 
was a heavy outflow of capital and some 35,000 people were killed. In the 
circumstances, the gross domestic product which had already fallen by 7% in 
1978 plunged by 25% in 1979. 
The growth rate of the Cuban economy declined in 1979.. After rising 
by over 8% in 1978, the material product 25/ grew by only 2.4% in 1979, the 
smallest increase in the last five years. The factors adversely affecting 
the growth rate included tropical storm Frederick, which caused flooding in 
both rural and urban areas as well as serious damage to infrastructure, 
housing and harvests, and the phitosanitary plague which hit the tobacco crop. 
The damage caused by these natural disasters was compounded by restrictions 
from the external sector, as a result of the lack of growth in the volume of 
exports of sugar and the increasing burden of servicing the short-term debt 
26/ The material product is the value of the gross product of the 
agricultural, mining, manufacturing, construction and electricity 
sectors. 
/contracted in 
- 28 -i 
contracted in recent years, which hindered the growth of imports. Finally, 
the growth of the economy in 1979 was restricted by the negligible growth of 
less than 1% in the productivity of labour. 
During 1979 there was also a drop in the global economic growth rate 
and a slight decline in the per capita product of Bolivia and Haiti, two of 
the least developed economies of the region (see table 19). 
In Bolivia the gross domestic product rose by a mere 1.5%, which is 
not only the lowest rate of the decade but also means that the steady loss 
of economic dynamism since 1977 continued. This lower growth rate was the 
result of pronounced declines in the mining and petroleum sectors,, the 
stagnation of agriculture and the slower growth of industry, construction, 
transport and trade, which were to some extent affected by the uncertainty 
arising from the electoral process and by the subsequent disorder's and . 
paralyzation of activities. 
In Haiti, the economic growth rate of nearly 2% was the second lowest 
of the decade. What is more, it failed to match the population growth rate 
and consequently the per capita product declined slightly for the third tine 
in the last five years. The fundamental cause of the weak total growth rate 
was the smaller growth of the agricultural sector, that still accounts for 
44% of the total product, affected in 1979 by the smaller coffee crop which 
reached the lowest level for the last 20 years. 
2. Total supply and demand 
In 1979 the growth rate of total supply rose for the fourth consecutive 
year. After increasing by roughly 5% in both 1977 and 1978, it grew by 7% 
in 1979 as a result of the faster growth of the product and, above ail, the 
much higher growth in the volume of imports of goods and services. The 
latter, after dropping slightly in 1975 and 1976 because of the restrictions 
imposed by many countries of the region in response to the effects of the 
world economic recession, grew at an average rate of a little over 8% in the 
following two years and by over 11% in 1979, thus exceeding the very high 
growth rates of the first half of the decade (see table 20). 
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As in the preceding three years, exports were the most dynamic factor 
of total demand in 1979. After declining by 3% during the international 
crisis of 1975, and despite the relatively sluggish growth of the world 
economy in the following four years, the volume of exports of goods and 
services rose by 35% in the period 1976-1978, and again by nearly 10% in 
1979. Thus the export coefficient continued to improve, inverting the 
declining trend it had followed until 1975 (see table 21). 
During 1979 there was also a sharp increase (8%) in fixed gross 
investment, whose growth rate rose for the third consecutive year and once 
again exceeded that of the product. Consequently, the investment coefficient 
continued its slow but steady rise during the decade, and for the first time 
neared 23%. 
3. Sectoral trends 
During 1979 all major production sectors grew more rapidly than in the 
previous year, with the exception of construction. The growth rates were 
most uneven, however. While mining and basic services grew by roughly 9% 
and the product of manufacturing industry by a little over 5%, agriculture 
grew by only slightly over 3%, while construction and other services rose by 
roughly 5.5% (see table 22). 
The considerable growth of the mining product, at a rate more than 
double that of 1978, was heavily influenced by the very high growth of the 
mining sectors in Mexico, Peru and Brazil and the sharp upturn in mining in 
Venezuela. In Mexico, which alone accounts for 38% of the total mining 
product of Latin America, the sector recorded a very high rate for the fourth 
consecutive year, primarily as a result of the sustained high growth of 
petroleum extractions. Mining also rose sharply in Peru, as a consequence 
of the rapid growth of oil production, whose volume in 1979 was double the 
1977 figure, and of the steady growth of copper output, which more than 
doubled the 1975 level. The acceleration of the growth rate of the mining 
product of the region was significantly affected by the expansion of nearly 
10% in mining in Venezuela, which accounts for one-sixth of the regional total, 
and where the mining product declined by one-third between 1973 and 1978 as a 
result of a systematic cut-back in oil production. Thus, of the main mining 
/countries, only 
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countries, only Chile recorded weak growth rates. On the other hand, very 
high rates were recorded in Guatemala (as a result of the ejqpansion of nickel 
output and the start of oil extraction), Brazil (stemming from the considerable 
rise in production of iron ore and a moderate rise in petroleum output) and 
Paraguay, and the growth rate picked up again in the Dominican Republic (with 
a much higher output of ferronickel and silver). 
During 1979 the industrial sector grew by 7.6%, a rate well above those 
of the preceding four years. This high rate reflected, firstly, the continued 
strong growth in manufacturing output in Brazil (7%) and particularly Mexico 
(nearly 9%), by far the most inportant industrial sectors of the region;27/ 
secondly, the upturn in industrial activity in Argentina, which accounts for 
one-sixth of the manufacturing product of the region and where industrial 
output rose by 11% in 1979 after having dropped by 8% in the previous year; 
and finally, the significant growth recorded in the manufacturing sectors of 
Uruguay, Ecuador and Chile. 
In Uruguay, industrial output rose by 10%, stimulated by the growth of 
domestic demand, sales to Argentinian tourists and the strong and steady 
expansion of exports of a broad range of manufactures. Manufacturing output 
also rose by 10% in Ecuador, as a result of appreciable growth in the metal 
products, machinery and equipment, chemicals, and wood and paper products 
industries. Because of this growth and the even higher rates recorded in 
earlier years, the manufacturing product in 1977 was more than double the 
1972 level. In Chile, on the other hand, the rise of nearly 9% in the 
manufacturing product represented, as in the three previous years, a further 
step towards recovering the level of activity which had existed before 1975, 
when it slumped by 27% as a result of the severely restrictive policy adopted 
to combat inflation and face up to the adverse effects of the international 
crisis. 
In -the other medium-sized economies of the region, the growth rate of the 
manufacturing product slipped from nearly 8.5% to less than 6% in Colombia, 
and from slightly over 5% to roughly 4.5% in Venezuela, while in Peru it rose 
by 4%, thus partially making good the declines of the two previous years. 
27/ In 1979 Brazil generated 38% of the industrial product of Latin 
America, while Mexico accounted for nearly one quarter. 
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In the Central American countries, manufacturing growth rates declined 
moderately in Guatemala and Costa Rica, and more steeply in Honduras, following 
three years of rapid growth. On the other hand, manufacturing output dropped 
by 7.5% in El Salvador and by over 27% in Nicaragua, as a result of the 
social and political conflicts in those countries. 
Although the growth rate of agriculture increased slightly from 2.8 
to 3.2% in 1979, it was once again the least dynamic sector of the economy 
(see table 22). 
This result was heavily influenced by the contrasting trends in 
agricultural output in Brazil and Mexico* which each accounted for roughly 
one-fifth of the total agricultural product of the region in 1979, and in 
Colombia and Argentina, which each accounted for roughly 15%. Whereas in 
Brazil the agricultural product rose by 3% - primarily because of the upturn 
in crop production, which had fallen steeply in 1978, in Mexico the growth 
rate of the sector declined for the second consecutive year, falling below 
the population growth rate , due to weather problems, and the lack of price 
incentives for grain production. The growth rate of the agricultural product 
also declined in Colombia, which had enjoyed the exceptionally high rate of 
9% in 1978. This was chiefly a consequence of the slower growth of coffee 
output, which rose by 5% in 1979 as opposed to over 16% in the previous year. 
Conversely, in Argentina the 5% rise in the agricultural product, chiefly 
stemming from a large harvest of cereal and oil-seed crops, almost trebled 
the 1978 rate. 
The largest relative growth of the agricultural product occurred in 
Chile: following a slight drop in 1978, it grew by nearly 8% as a result of 
the appreciable increase in the production of legumes and fruit and the 
upturn in output of cereals and meat. 
On the other hand, the growth rate declined slightly in Venezuela and 
Paraguay, following considerable rises in both countries in the previous two 
years, and more sharply in El Salvador, Guatemala and Haiti. In the other 
Central American countries, with the exception of Honduras, the agricultural 
product declined in absolute terms; this was also the case in the Dominican 
Republic where agricultural activity was hit by hurricane David and tropical 
storm Flora, and in Bolivia, where agricultural output was harmed by excessive 
rain and flooding. 
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In contrast with the other goods-producing sectors, the growth rate of 
the construction industry declined in 1979, after having been the most dynamic 
sector of the economy in the preceding two years. The rate dropped from 
nearly 8% in 1977-1978 to 5.5% in 1979. 
This drop was chiefly the result of much less favourable trends in 
construction in Brazil, Venezuela and Colombia. In Brazil, after growing at 
an extraordinarily high and sustained annual rate of over 12% between 1970 
and 1976 and a rate of 9.5% in 1977-1978, the construction sector grew by 
less than 4% in 1979. This sharp drop was primarily due to the restrictive 
policy applied in public works in order to slow inflation and to the real 
decline in the volume of loans granted by the housing finance system for the 
same reason. The credit-squeeze policy adopted to slow inflation and the 
sharp drop in real investment by the Government were likewise the causes of 
the virtual stagnation of construction in Venezuela in 1979. this brought 
an end to the extraordinary boom of construction during the preceding eight 
years, when the product of the sector more than tripled. Anti-inflation 
measures also adversely affected construction in Colombia, where; the sectoral 
product declined by 4% in 1979, after having recovered in the previous two 
years from the drop of nearly 18% which occurred in 1975-1976. 
In contrast with the unfavourable trends in the construction sector in 
those three countries, the sector continued to grow rapidly in Uruguay and 
especially in Paraguay, and recovered appreciably in Chile. 
In Uruguay, the construction sector grew by 20% in 1979', following rates 
of 15% in 1977 and neariy 11% in 1978, primarily thanks to the enormous rise 
of 44% in private construction. This was concentrated in Montevideo, 
primarily the resort area of Punta del Este, and was largely financed by 
foreign private investment. 
The growth of construction was even greater in Paraguay, where it rose 
for the third consecutive year by roughly 30% following an average annual 
rate of 17.5% in 1974-1977. As a conséquence of this extraordinary growth, 
largely linked with the construction of the Itaipu dam, the construction 
product in 1979 was more than triple the 1974 level, while the share of fixed 
investment rose from 19% in 1974 to over 33% in 1979. 
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During 1979 there was also very high growth (26%) of the construction 
product in Chile. This growth was the result of the expansion of economic 
activity in general and, above all, of the sharp drop in real interest rates, 
which had reached exceptionally high levels in the previous three years. This 
considerable growth of construction in 1979, together with the much smaller 
increases in the two preceding years, was not enough to make up for the sharp 
drop which occurred in 1975-1977, and the product of the sector was still far 
short of 1974 levels. 
Finally, in 1979 the product generated by basic services grew at a very 
rapid rate of nearly 9%, primarily as a result of the high growth of the 
electricity sector, while the value added by other services rose by nearly 6%. 
Although this was a considerably higher rate than in 1978 and 1977, as in 
those years it was lower than the rate for the goods-producing sectors as a 
whole. On the other hand, the relative growth of those sectors was lower 
than the growth rate of basic services for the third consecutive year (see 
table 22). 
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IV. THE EXTERNAL SECTOR 
1. Foreign trade 
In 1979 the foreign trade of Latin America expanded very rapidly for the 
fourth consecutive year. The total value of exports and imports of goods and 
services increased by over 28% to reach a total of nearly US$ 1,800 billion, 
80% greater than 4 years previously and nearly five times the 1970 figure. 
As in 1976-1977, the rapid expansion of foreign trade in 1979 was 
primarily the result of the considerable growth of exports of goods, the value 
of which increased by 33.5%, well above the likewise considerable rise (26%) 
in imports of goods. \ 
As a result of the difference in the growth rates of imports and exports, 
the balance of the trade in goods for the region as a whole showed a surplus 
of nearly US$ 19 billion in 1979, in contrast with a deficit of over US$ 15 
billion in 1978. This turnabout, however, was exclusively caused by the 
change in the trade balance of the group of five oil-exporting countries, 
whose terms of trade improved sharply and whose trade in goods swung from a 
deficit of US$ 26.5 billion in 1978 to a surplus of nearly 26 billion in 1979. 
In contrast, the remaining 18 economies of the region, whose terns of trade 
worsened for the second consecutive year, and which had recorded a surplus 
in the trade of goods of a little over US$ 11 billion in 1978, showed a 
deficit of US$ 7 billion in 1979. 
(a) Exports of goods 
As mentioned earlier, in 1979 the value of exports of goods of Latin 
America was one third greater than in 1978 (see tables 23 and 24). Furthermore, 
this very steep rise (following on appreciable but significantly smaller 
increases in the three preceding years) was very widespread. 
The value of exports declined in only three of the twenty-three countries 
of the region, and in one of these - Guyana - the fall was very small, while 
the larger drops in the escorts of Haiti (-10%) and Nicaragua (-12%) were 
caused by exceptional factors: the slump in coffee output in Haiti to the 
lowest level in the last 20 years, and the bloody civil war in Nicaragua. 
/In contrast, 
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In contrast, the value of exports of goods increased by 80% in Peru, 
as a result of the virtual quadrupling of oil sales, very strong growth in 
exports of silver, copper and lead, all of which enjoyed steep price rises, 
and the doubling of the value of non-traditional exports, which had already 
grown exceptionally rapidly in the three previous years, and whose level in 
1979 was 5 tines that of the three years earlier. 
The value of exports also increased very rapidly (55%) both in Venezuela, 
primarily as a result of higher oil prices, and in Chile, due to better prices 
for copper and molybdenum and the expansion of non-traditional exports, whose 
value continued to rise steeply, with an increase of nearly 570% in the last 
five years. 
The growth rate of the value of exports was also very high in Mexico 
(46%) and Ecuador (4-0%), both of which benefited from the new large increases 
in world oil prices. In Ecuador, sales of petroleum and petroleum products, 
which account for nearly half the total value of exports of goods, almost 
doubled although their volume dropped by 4%. The. increase,was even greater 
in Mexico, where the value of exports of petroleum and petroleum products 
rose by 117%, reaching a level seven times that of 1976. 
The widespread nature of the growth of Latin American exports is further 
reflected in the fact that exports rose by between 20 and 34% in.8 other 
countries (Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia,..Dominican Republic, 
El Salvador and Honduras), by about 18% in Paraguay and Trinidad and Tobago, 
and by roughly 14% in Uruguay and Panama (see table 24). 
The striking rise in the value of exports of goods was the result both 
of considerably higher unit values - over 20% on average - and the sharp 
expansion of the volume of ejqports. The latter had risen steadily and rapidly 
during the previous three years and increased by nearly 11% in 1979, with a 
total increment of 44% in the period 1976-1979 (see table 23). 
The exceptional expansion of the quantum of exports, and above all the 
fact that this occurred during a year in which the growth rate of the central 
economies slackened, with a resurgence of protectionist practices in some of 
them, are clear indications of the growing dynamism and versatility of the 
export sector in many countries of the region and of the increasing importance 
in recent years of trade within Latin America and with the countries of OPEC 
and some Asian nations. 
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This was also reflected in the fact that the volume of ejqports once 
again increased more rapidly in the group of non-oil-exporting countries (12%) 
than in the group of countries whose export earnings are derived primarily 
from oil sales (8%). In the former group, the quantum of exports grew very 
rapidly, at rates of between 11 and 38%, in a large and varied range of 
countries including Barbados, Brazil., Colombia, Chile, the Dominican Republic, 
El Salvador, Honduras, Paraguay and Peru (see table 24). Thanks to these 
increases, and to equally rapid; growth in the previous three years, the volume 
of exports of the non-oil-exporting countries as a group was almost 50% higher 
in 1979 than in 1975. 
The rather smaller but nevertheless considerable rise (8%) in the 
quantum of ejq>orts of the oil-exporting countries, on the other hand, was 
exclusively due to the vigorous and sustained growth of Mexican e?g>orts 
- whose volume increased by nearly 14%, with a total growth of nearly 90% in 
three years, and the turnabout in the volume of Venezuelan exports, which 
increased by 6% in 1979 after shrinking steadily between 1973 and 1978. In 
Bolivia and Trinidad and Tobago the quantum of ejqports declined for the third 
consecutive year, and in Ecuador for the second time in the last three years. 
As was pointed out above, during 1979 the unit value of Latin American 
exports also increased appreciably (20%). Naturally this increment was 
particularly pronounced (35%) in the oil-exporting countries, which benefited 
from the considerable rises in world oil prices during the year. Although 
much smaller, the rise in the unit price of exports was also considerable 
- nearly 13% in the non-oil-exporting countries. In this group, the average 
price, of escorts rose in all countries with the exception of Colombia and El 
Salvador, which were harmed by the drop in world coffee prices. In contrast, 
the rise in the unit value of exports was pronounced in Barbados, as a result 
of better world sugar prices; in the Dominican Republic, due to better prices 
for bauxite, ferronickel and especially gold and silver; in Argentina and 
Uruguay, primarily because of higher meat and cereal prices; in Chile, which 
benefited from the higher prices of copper and especially molybdenum; and 
above all in Peru, which benefited from the virtual doubling of the prices of 
oil, silver, lead, and fish oil and the higher prices of copper, cotton, zinc 
and sugar in 1979. 
/(b) Imports 
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(b) Imports of goods 
Imports of goods also grew sharply in 1979, although less so than 
exports. Their value rose by over 26%, as â result of a 10% rise in volume 
and a 15% rise in unit value (see table 25). 
In contrast with what had occurred in the -previous four years, the 
growth of the quantum of imports was higher in the group of non-oil-exporting 
than in the oil-exporting countries. ' 
In the second group, the volume of imports rose by nearly 9%, but this 
growth was almost exclusively due to the large rise in real imports of Mexico, 
which rose by one-third in 1979 following a 28.5% increase in 1978. This 
growth, largely attributable to the upturn in Mexican economic growth and 
large-scale purchases by the petroleum industry, was particularly strong in 
the case of imports of capital goods, whose value rose by 65%, double the 
average amount for the period 1976-1977. 
In contrast, the volume of imports dropped by 10% in Venezuela, as a 
result of a new and more pronounced decline in the economic growth rate and 
of the restrictive policy adopted to tackle mounting inflationary pressures 
and reduce the large deficit generated on current account in 1977 and 1978. 
Despite this decline and the 3% drop in the volume of imports in 1978, and 
thanks to soaring growth during the four-year period 1974-1977, the quantum 
of Venezuelan imports in 1979 was still double the 1973 level, the year before 
the first sharp rise in world oil prices. 
Conversely, in the non-oil-exporting countries, thé rise of nearly 11% 
in the volume of iiipbrts in 1979 represented the first large rise since 1974, 
> 
and meant that for the first time they rose slightly above the very high level 
attained by real imports in that year (see table 23). 
Although the volume of imports rose during 1979 in all the nôn-oil-
exporting countries with the exception of El Salvador, Haiti and Nicaragua, 
•4 . 
the increase was particularly pronounced in Argentina, -the other Southern Cone 
countries and Barbados, Paraguay, Peru, the Dominican Republic, Brazil and 
Honduras. 
In Argentina, the volume of imports climbed by 38%. This exceptional 
growth was the result of the joint action of three major factor's. The first 
of these was the strong growth of the economy following four years of stagnation; 
/the second 
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the second was the fall in the real rate of exchange, which, bearing in mind 
the rise in world prices, reduced in relative terms the prices of imported 
goods in local currency; and the third was the introduction of a tariff reform 
designed gradually to cut the level and range of tariffs in the medium term. 
As a consequence of these changes, the value of imports of capital goods rose 
by 41%,, the value of imports of intermediate goods (excluding fuels) by 63%, 
and that of consumer goods more than trebled. 
The smaller but stiU appreciable growth in the quantum of imports in 
Uruguay. (30%) and Chile (15%) had similar causes, although unlike the Argentinian 
case they represented the continuation of a rising trend which had set in 
several years earlier, thus, in Uruguay the rapid growth in the quantum of 
imports in 1979 was buoyed by the unusually large rise in the gross domestic 
product, the open-economy policy adopted by the Government in order to modify 
the production structure of the economy and fight inflation in the short term, 
and by the fall in the real rate of exchange. In these circumstances, all 
imports rose very rapidly. The growth of purchases of consumer goods was 
particularly pronounced, more than doubling in value, while imports of capital 
goods increased by 44% and those of intermediate goods (excluding petroleum 
and petroleum products) by 70%. ' 
The rapid growth of domestic output, the conclusion of the programme of 
tariff cuts begun in 1974 (under which by mid-1979 all imported goods (with 
the exception of some automobiles) were subject to a single standard 10% 
tariff) aid the drop in the real rate of exchange that occurred in the last 
quarter of the year as a result of the adoption of a fixed parity, were the 
main causes of the 15% rise in the volume of Chilean imports. Although this 
followed on even larger increase?; in earlier years, as the quantum of imports 
had fallen sharply in 1975-1976 the level in 1979 was only 10% above that of 
1974. 
In Paraguay, on the other hand, the 21% increase in the quantum of imports 
in 1979 represented a continuation of the extraordinarily dynamic growth 
process which began in 1976, with the volume of imports rising by nearly 120% 
by 1979. 
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In contrast , in Brazil arid especially in Peru the growth of the volume 
of inports during 1979j while significant, was such that imports remained 
below the levels Attained on the eve of the recession which affected the 
world economy in the mid-1970s. In Peru, the greater availability of foreign 
exchange, the gradual liberalization of import controls and bans, the growth 
of domestic investment and the- resumption of -external financing combined with 
the reversing of the falling trendin economic activity to create an increase 
of nearly 12% in the quantum of imports; 'Due to thè very large drops in the 
preceding three years, however, the 1979 level remained one third below that 
of the period 1974-^1975; . V: . . . -L 
The trend Wasi similar but much less pronourtced in Brazil, where the 
volume of imports, after growing very rapidly until 1974, fell steadily in 
the next three years, rose by nearly 6% in 1978 arid continued to recover, 
although more sharply in 1979. Nevertheless, although the growth rate of the 
quantum of inports was'nearly 10%, higher than the growth rate of the product, 
both the import coefficient and the total Volume of inports remained lower 
in 1979 than in 1974. Between those two years, the' former dropped from 10.5% 
to 7.2%, while the quantum of imports fell by'5%. ' ^ 
The unit valuè of imports rose by 15% iri 1979, after three years in 
which the average increase wa£: ròughiy 6%; 5"Ìiàtt^àlly , the rise was much 
larger in the oil-importing countries than in the dil-éxpòrting countries. 
In tiie latter«', the average price of imports rose by 8%, a figure5 oniy slightly 
above that fór thè previous three years, in contrast, in the non-oil-exporting 
countries the rise in the unit value of inports was nearly -20%. This increase 
was mòre than triple the average for the period 1975-1978, arid was oriljK 
surpassed in the entire 1970s by the rise in 1974, when thè first and largest 
rise in oil prices was introduced by the OPEC countries (see table 23). 
Obviously, the striking difference between trends in the unit value of 
inports in the oil-exportirig and in the oil-inporting Countries was 
fundamentally the result Of the fresh large increases in world oil prices in 
1979. . • ' ' • ' • • 
In the second group, the impact of those rises was reflected in the 
extraordinarily large rise in the value of oil inports and also in the proportion 
they represented in total inports of goods. Thus, the value of inports of oil 
/and petroleum 
- 40 -i 
and petroleum products rose by between 42% and 52% in Guatemala, Panama, 
Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Brazil and Guyana:, by 66% in Costa Rica and 
nearly 80% in Colombia, and more than doubled in Argentina, Barbados and 
Chile. Such imports represented between 20 and 30% of the total value of imports 
of goods in 1979 by Barbados, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Haiti, 
Jamaica, Nicaraguai Panama^ Paraguay and Uruguay, and 35% of total Brazilian 
imports. In almost all the countries.these percentages were well above those 
recorded in 1978, and in most of them were triple the 1973 figures (see table 
(c) Ihe purchasing power of exports and the terms of trade 
Buoyed by the' vigorous growth in the volume of exports and by the 
partial recovery of the-terms of trade, the purchasing,power of Latin American 
exports of goods and services rose by 16.5% in 1979* Thus, the purchasing 
power of the region's exports, after dropping sharply;in 1975, registered a 
growth of nearly 46% over thè next four ,years and an average annual rate of 
7.5% during the decade às a whole (see table 27). , . 
Trends in the purchasing power of exports during 1979 varied enormously 
between the oil-importing andoil-exporting countries. In the latter, the 
purchasing power of exports: 'grew much more rapidly ( 2ß%), the main factor in 
the increase being the considerable improvement once again in the external 
terms of trade* which rose by 25%, thus more than doubling the level at the 
beginning of the-decade (see table 28). What is more, in countries such as 
Ecuador, and particularly Venezuela, where oil sales account for an. 
exceptionally large proportion of earnings from exports of goods, the 
improvement in the terms of trade during the decade was even greater. 
In the group consisting of the remaining 18 countries of the region, the 
rise in the purchasing power of esqports was smallest and had a different 
cause. In those countries, the sole cavee of the increase of more thai 8% 
was the growth of the volume of exports, which rose by. nearly 12%, pursuing 
their vigorous expansion of the previous three years and for the second 
consecutive year making up for the worsening in the terms of trade. 
/The terms 
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The terms of trade declihed by nearly 6%, thus dropping to the lowest 
level in the decade. This drop was widespread, and the terms of trade improved 
in only three countries: Chile (7%) thanks primarily to the recovery of copper 
prices and the extraordinary steep rise in world molybdenum prices; Peru,(27%), 
thanks to the good prices-for copper, silver, lead and zinc end the considerable 
rise in oil prices, -which'it began to ejqiort;in much larger quantities in 
1979; and the Dominican Republic, whose exports were favoured by the much 
higher prices of gold and silver, and: to a lesser extent by the rise in world 
sugar prices in the second half of the year. : ; j ' 
2. The balance of payments " 
The trade and current account balances 
A,more rapid growth in exports of goods (34%) than in inports of 
merchandise (26%) meant that visible trade, which in 1978 had registered a 
deficit of slightly over US$ 1.5 billion, in.1979 generated a surplus of 
nearly US$ 1.9 billion. However, since at the same time net payments for 
non-factor services continued to increase rapidly, the trade deficit only 
dropped from US$ 5.9 billion in 1978 to slightly over US$ 4 billion in 1979 
(see table 29). 
All in all, these global changes once again constituted the result of 
the very uneven evolution of the commercial transactions of oil-exporting and 
non-oil-exporting countries. In fact, while the former progressed from a 
trade deficit of US$ 4.3 billion in 1978 to a surplus of US$ 400 million in 
1979, in the latter the deficit which had already doubled in 1976 nearly 
tripled in 1979 when it increased from nearly US$ 1.6 billion to US$ 4.45 
billion. 
These changes in the aggregate figures of each of the groups stemmed 
from trends which sometimes ran counter in the different countries conposing 
them. The inversion of the trade balance of the oil-exporting countries was 
basically a result of the radical change experienced in Venezuela's trade, 
which after generating an enormous deficit of close on US$ 4.5 billion in 
1978, showed a surplus of US$ 650 million in 1979 as a result of the rocketing 
value of exports in 1979 (56%) and the slight drop which simultaneously 
occurred in the inport total. In Mexico, however - the second main oil-
exporting country of the region - the trade deficit worsened notoriously, 
/although in 
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although in 1979 the yalue of exports of goods increased for the third 
year running at the exceptionally high rate of 46%, , 
Among the non-oi 1-eporting countries, the increase in the deficit of 
trade in goods and services mainly reflected the evolution of international 
trade in Brazil and Argentina and to a lesser extent the deterioration of the 
trade balance of the majority of the Central American and Caribbean countries. 
In Brazil - where the trade balance had gradually fallen from US$ 6.3 
billion in 1974 to nearly US$ 1.7 billion in 1977 as a result of the vigorous 
growth of exports and the total constraint on the.amount of imports, but 
where the imbalance between exports and imports began to grow in 1978 when 
imports once again began to increase - the trade deficit once more shot up 
in 1979, from nearly US$ 2.9 billion in 1978 to close on US$ 5.1 billion in 
1979 mainly as a result of the considérable increasé .in the value of imports 
of fuels. • . , 
In Argentina - which during thè period 1976-1978 obtained large and 
increasing surpluses in its trade in goods and services'- the trade surplus 
dropped sharply from over US$ 2.7 billion in 1978 to slightly under US$ 1 
billion in 1979 as a result of1 thé exceptional increase' of 74% in the value 
of imports of goods and services in that year. 
Peru and Colònibili' hòwever , achie^d large surpluses , in their.-trade in 
1979 while Chile reduced its 1978 deficit by over US$ 200 million and £1 
Salvador transformed its deficit into a-small surplus of nearly US$ 10 million. 
The improvement in trade was particularly marked in Peru. This 
country, which in 1978 had achieved a small trade surplus after accumulating 
a substantial deficit over the previous five years, in 1979 obtained a 
sizeable surplus of nearly US$ 1.45 billion basically as a result of the 
exceptional increase of 70% in the value of its exports of goods and services 
in that year. The trade surplus achieved by Colombia, although only half" 
that of Peru, represented thé continuation of the trend begun in 1975 as a; 
result of the coffee boom which permitted Colombia to obtain large surpluses 
in its trade in each of the previous five years (see table 29). 
• ,, • /Despite the 
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Despite the drop in the trade deficit, forthe region as a whole, 
during 1979 the current account imbalance increased for the third consecutive 
year and amounted to the unprecedented sum of US$ 18.3 billion, as a result 
of the spectacular growth of 46%- in net'payments-of profits, and interest 
in 1979 (see table 30). . ; .» , 
Although the current account position deteriorated,in 13 of the 18 
non-oil-exporting countries, whose jointdeficit reached the never before 
registered sum of nearly US$ 13/5 billion, the changes-were particularly 
marked inBrazil,• Argentina*Uruguay*' Paraguay and the majority of the 
Central American and Caribbean economies,-
Brazil's current account deficit reached the unprecedented figure of 
US$ 10.45 billion, more than doubling the deficit registered in this country 
only two years previously. In Argentina, the substantial surplus of nearly 
US$ 2.1 billion on current account in 1978 becamein 1979 a deficit of 
slightly over US$ 500 million. 'Both in Uruguay and Paraguay the current 
account -deficits more than doubled their 1978 amounts in 1979, while Guyana'.s 
deficit hearly'tripled that of the previous year in 1979^, In Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, Jamaica and Panama, the ̂current account,deficits were between 55 . 
and 70% higher than irt 1978 and.doubled or tripled:the respective deficits . 
recorded inr 1977. 'r' '̂'"i • • •-->.r i • • v , • ,- . v . 
In this group of countries, only Peru and Colombia obtained substantial 
surpluses'on their current operations in 1979 while Nicaragua and El Salvador 
achieved small surpluses owing to the fact that in the former inports of 
goods fell by nearly 40% as a result of the paralyzation of economic activity 
caused by the civil war, while in the second coffee exports grew by over 60% 
when the substantial surplus of beans which had been accumulated the previous 
year weis sold in 1979. 
Surprisingly enough, the current account situation, also deteriorated 
in all the oil-exporting countries, except for Venezuela and Trinidad and 
Tobago. In 1979 Bolivia recorded an unprecedented deficit of around 
US$ 475 million, while in Ecuador the current account deficit was two-thirds 
higher in 1979 than in 1978. But the most marked change took .place in 
Mexico^ where the current account showed a deficit of nearly US$ 4.25 billion, 
80% higher than the previous year's deficit and even exceeding the enormous 
/deficit recorded 
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deficit recorded in 1975. The cut in the current deficit of the oil-exporting 
countries as a whole from US$ 8.2 billion in 1978 to US$ 4.8 billion in 1979 
stemmed almost exclusively from the very considerable drop in Venezuela's 
deficit, which after increasing from US$ 3 billion in 1977 to US$ 5.3 billion 
in 1978, dropped to only US$ 200 million in 1979. 
Cb) The capital account 
During 1979 the net inflow of non-compensatory capital to the region as 
a whole amounted to nearly US$ 25.5 billion. This sum not only exceeded by 
14% the very large amount registered in 1978 - a year when the net inflow of 
non-compensatory capital had already experienced an exceptional increase of 
44% - but also exceeded the amount of the deficit on current account. Latin 
America's balance of payments thus finally gave a surplus.of an unprecedented 
magnitude of close on US$ 7.1 billion (see table 30). 
Although Brazil was once again the country which attracted the greatest 
part of the capital which poured into Latin America, its distribution among 
the different countries was better balanced in 1979 than in 1978. This was 
largely due to the fact that in 1979 the flow of capital towards Brazil and 
Venezuela dwindled while the resources attracted by Mexico, Chile, Colombia, 
Peru, Uruguay and, above all, Argentina, increased substantially. 
In Brazil the net amount of resources received dropped from an 
exceptionally high level of US$ 11 billion in 1978 to slightly, under US$ 7.6 
billion in 1979, as a result on the one hand of the large increase in 
amortization payments and on the other of the reduction in loans resulting from 
thé policy adopted by the economic authorities in April, which established the 
obligation in the Central Bank of freezing half the new loans contracted abroad 
and restricted the contracting of new loans by the public sector. Thus Brazil, 
which in 1978 received nearly half the total movement of loans and investments 
towards the region, in 1979 only attracted 30%. 
During 1979 Venezuela's share in the total net flow of non-compensatory 
capital also dropped sharply - from over 15% in 1978 to less than 6% - when 
the net sum of the resources entering this country dropped from slightly 
over US$ 3.4 billion in 1978 to US$ 1.45 billion in 1979. 
/The movement 
- 45 -i 
The movement of capital towards Mexico, however, increased sharply for 
the second year running, reaching a net amount of US$ 4.6 billion, 70% 
higher than the figure registered the previous year and 135% higher than that 
for 1977. This trend was decisively influenced by the favourable 
expectations created by the greater dynamism of the evolution of the Mexican 
economy in 1979 and particularly the rapid growth of its oil industry and 
the discovery of hew and well-stocked wells in the Gulf of Carrpeche. These 
changes in expectations were reflected in -the drastic reverse in the flow of 
short-term capital - which after registering substantial deficits in the 
previous three years in 1979 generated a surplus for the first time since 
1973 - and in the very large amount (US$ 10.4 billion) of the long-term loans 
obtained by the public sector. 
The net inflow of non-conpensatory capital was also much higher in 
1979 in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, which continued to apply measures aimed 
at opening up their economies commercially and financially to the exterior 
during that year. The increase in loans was particularly marked in 
Argentina, which after recording a net outflow of capital in 1978 received 
credits and investment for a net sum of over US$ 4.9 billion, and in 1979 became 
the region's second main recipient of external resources after Brazil. 
During 1979 the amount of external resources attracted by Colombia r 
also continued to grow very rapidly, while the net movement of non-conpensatory 
capital towards Peru made a recovery. In the former country, the incoming 
capital, after tripling in 1978, doubled in 1979, and amounted to nearly 
US$ 740 million. In Peru, the notable improvement in the external sector 
which took place in 1979 encouraged an increase in medium- and long-term 
loans to the public sector. As a result of this and of the refinancing of 
the external debt the net inflow of non-compensatory capital, which dropped 
from US$ 1 billion to 150 million during 1977 and 1978, recovered in 1979 
and reached the sum of US$ 925 million. 
The net inflow of non-compensatory capital also increased in all the 
othèr economies of the region with the sole exceptions of Bolivia and Guyana 
- where it dropped slightly - and Trinidad and Tobago, El Salvador and 
Nicaragua - where there were net outflows of capital. 
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However» the increase in the net inflow of capital did not succeed in 
preventing the closing of the balance of payments on a deficit in nine of 
the region's economies. ~ This was the case of all the economies of Central 
America, with the sole exception of.;Honduras, of Bolivia ,and Guyana for the 
second time in the last-three years, Jamaica for the; fifth year running and 
Brazil which in 1979 had a deficit of pearly US$ ,-.2.9 billion, after obtaining 
a surplus of over US$ 3.95 billion during the.previous,;year. 
In the remaining fourteen countries, the balance -of payments closed with 
a surplus. The most substantial of these was that obtained by Argentina, 
which achieved the exceptionally high, sum of̂ USia 4.4.billion, more than 
doubling the surplus of the previous year. This situation also occurred in 
Coloribia which obtained a surplus of US$ 1.26 billion which more than doubled 
the surpluses of 1977; and 1978. The balancetpf-payments surplus also 
increased substantially in Chile, from nearly US$ 625 million in 1978 to 
nearly US$1:05 billion in 1979. All in .all, the biggest reverses were in 
the balance of : payments of Venezuela r- which- after Registering a deficit of 
US$ 1.9 billion-in 1978 obtained a surplus of US$ 1.25 billion in 1979 -
and Peru which transformed.its deficit of. US$ 100 million in 1978 into a 
large surplus of over;US$ 1.57 billion in 1979, which. lrras only exceeded that 
year in the region by the considerable surplus -c?btain§4 by Argentina (see 
table 30). . 
Naturally,, these balance-of-payments results were generally reflected 
in the evolution1:of the gross international reserves. In the region as a ..... 
whole these grew by nearly 21%, a very similar rate to that of their growth . 
over the last three years. As a result of this increase, the absolute sum 
of Latin America's gross international reserves was close on US$ 41 billion 
at the end of 1979 (see table 31). . ; 
Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru and Chile contributed particularly 
to this growth of reserves. In Argentina - where the reserves had already 
increased notably in the last three years -. they nearly doubled in 1979 and 
were thus 32 times those of 1975. As a result of this increase, Argentina 
replaced Brazil as the country with the largest reserves in the region. 
During 1979 the rapid and persistent growth of Colombia's gross reserves 
also continued - they increased eight-fold in the last four years 
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and exceeded US$ 3.8 billion in December1 1979 - and those of Chile - where 
the reserves increased by nearly 80% in the course of the year and thus 
multiplied their total at the end of 1975 by 35 (see table 31) . 
However, the greatest relative-increase in. reserves took place in 
Peru, where they nearly quadrupled in 1979 and exceededvUS$ 1.5 billion. 
There was also a considerable change-over in Venezuela where gross reserves 
grew by more than 20% following three years of continuous decline. 
Brazil's gross reserves, however, which, fiearly tripled between 1975 and 
1978, fell by 24% in 1979* as a result of the heavy deficit registered that 
year in the balance of payments. 
Lastly, gross reserves declined in all the Central American economies 
- with the sole exceptions of Honduras and particularly Nicaragua, where 
they increased by 67% as a result of the international co-operation received 
during the second half of the year - and dropped very steeply in Guyana, 
which meant that at the end of the year they were equivalent to barely two 
weeks of import requirements'. 1 -
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V. INFLATION 
During 1979 the inflationary, processes -in Latin America became 
generalized and their pace increased. For-the region as a whole, the price 
growth rate rose from slightly over 40% in 1978 to 55% in 1979, while the 
number of countries in which consumer prices rose more rapidly than the 
previous year (17) was'more than three times the number of those in which 
inflation became; less acute (5) (see table 3 2 , • 
Naturally, the inflationary process took on very different dimensions 
in the different countries. In the group formed by Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay - bringing together the majority 
of the biggest and most developed economies of the region where inflation 
rates have traditionally1 been high - the average rate, of increase of consumer 
prices rose from slightly under 48% in 1978 to 63% in 1979. In the remaining 
economies of Latin Atoerica and the Caribbean - where inflation between 1975 
was similar to that of the industrialized countries: - the rate of increase 
in consumer prices rose on average from 10% in 1978 to 22% in 1979. This 
latter figure was the highest of the decade and slightly exceeded that 
registered in 1974, when the international price of oil experienced its first 
significant increase and when the unit value of Latin American imports rose 
by over 40%. 
However, also within each of the groups considered there were 
substantial differences in the level and trends of the process of inflation. 
In the first group of countries considered the growth rate of prices 
fell only in Argentina and Peru, but in both cases the drop was not very 
marked and inflation oontinued to be very high (140% and 67% respectively). 
On the other hand, inflation put on a sharp spurt in Uruguay (from 46 to 
83%) and in Brazil (from 38 to 76%), and to a lesser extent in Chile (from 
30 to 39%) and Colombia (from 19 to 29%). 
The intensification of inflation was also the general norm in the 
second group of countries considered, although among these there were some, 
such as Ecuador, Guyana and particularly Jamaica, which succeeded in 
moderating the increases in prices. In the majority, however, inflation 
rates far exceeded the usual rates of the past. In Bolivia the rate of 
/increase of 
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increase of consumer prices more than tripled, rising from 13.5% in 1978 to 
45.5% in 1979, this, latter rate even exceeding the very high rates 
registered in the period 1973-1974,A similar intensification of inflation 
took place in Venezuela, where inflation in 1979 reached a level never 
before registered of almost 21%, nearly tripling the previous year's rate, 
and in Haiti, where the rate of increase of prices went up from 5.5% to 
over 15% in the last few years» Inflation also increased sharply in 
Paraguay, from less than 17% in 197,8 to nearly 36% in 1979. However, the 
largest increases in the rate, of inflation took place, in the Dominican 
Republic where the prape level rose by more than 26%, after remaining 
nearly stable in 1978. - and in Nicaragua - where the rate of inflation rose 
from 4% in 197-8 to over 70% in 1979. Lastly, inflation also notably 
increased its pace in Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama and Trinidad 
and Tobago (see table 32),. , , .ri 
Although the factors determining inflation and its relative incidence 
in the rate of growth of prices were very diverse in the different 
countries, it is, obvious that one of the main causes of the generalized 
increase in. the p.$ce of inflation in Latin America in 1979 was international 
inflation., The average prices of imports - which over the previous three 
years had increased at a rate of around 6% - rose by 15% in 1979, thus 
generating strppg pressures on costs and domestic price levels (see table 33). 
This inflationary factor, largely attributable to the new and large-scale 
increases in international prices of fuels during 1979., naturally affected 
the oil-importing countries with particular intensity, and especially the 
relatively more industrialized countries like Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, 
where imported oil represents a considerable fraction of total fuel-
consumption. However, because of the exacerbation of inflation in the 
majority of the industrialized countries, with its consequences on prices 
of manufactures, imported inflation in 1979 affected the Latin American 
economies in general, including those which are net exporters of oil. The 
inflationary effect of the increase in the price of imports was augmented 
in a large number of cases by that stemming from the considerable increase 
, in 1979 in the .prices of Latin. American exports, which after falling around 
4% on average in 1978 increased by over 20% in 1979. 
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The evolution of the level of'p'rioes ih the different countries also 
reflected the influence of the economic policy, tïie evolution of domestic 
demand and the upheavals in economic activity originating in climatic factors 
or socio-political conflicts. 
Among the elements connected with the administration of the economy, 
the exchange policy in some countries had a particular incidence on the course 
of inflation. This Was the case in Bolivia, where the 25%-increase in the 
exchange rate agreed upon in November after seven years ih which parity had 
remained fixed, contributed decisively tò speeding up the rate of price 
increases at the end'of the year. "' These price'ŝ  which had increased by 15% up 
to October, rose by o\ter 4% in November and had ah exceptional increase of 
nearly 22% in December, These rocketing price levels wéré also affected by 
the measures adopted at the end of November which led tò a readjustment of 
between 30% and 60% in the prices of fuels and transport, to the 
liberalization of food prices and the granting of a bonus to the majority of 
the wage-workers to compensate for thé rise in the cost of living. 
The modification of the exchange policy also played an important role in 
inverting in 1979 the downward trend which had been appearing in Chilean 
inflation in the previóùs five years. After becoming practically stabilized 
at an annual rate of '30% in the first half of the year I inflation rose sharply 
in the third quarter, largely as a consequence of the devaluation of the peso 
adopted at the end of June. This unexpected increase in the exchange ràte 
not only directly raised the price of marketable goods but also adversely 
affected expectations as to the course of prices, the 39% increase in which 
at the end of the year more than exceeded the 30% registered in 1978. 
Although partly caused by administrative measures aimed at correcting 
the distortions created by the lag in the prices of some food articles and 
public service tariffs, the doubling of the inflation rate in Brazil from 
38% in 1978 to 76%.in 1979 was also due in part to the policy of devaluations 
of the cruzeiro. This policy - directed at reducing the external account 
disequilibrium - aimed at and achieved the raising of the réal exchange rate 
through a combination of 18 mini-devaluations èffected in the course of the 
year and a special devaluation of the cruzeiro of aroimd'30% at the beginning 
• ' ' " /of December, 
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of December. As a result of this large increase in the exchange rate, prioes 
rose by over 7% during that month and the rate; of inflation speeded up-, 
notably in the next few months. 
In Argentina the exchange rate on the contrary contributed to reducing 
the rate of inflation. So as to direct and diminish the substantial . 
inflationary expectations generated in the previous four years, during which 
price levels increased 136-fold, the authorities fixed the exchange rate,, in 
advance, and raised it monthly in proportions which decreased from slightly 
over 5% in January to ;around 3% in December, With the same object, they 
also pre-established increases on a decreasing-scale in the tariffs and prices 
which the State enterprises could charge throug&out the year,• Partly as a 
consequence of these measures^ the rate of increase of prices r particularly 
wholesale prices - began to decline in the last three months of the year. 
This drop was also decisively influenced by the1 turnabout in the trend of 
meat prices, which after riéirig at a monthly rate of 13% up to August, dropped 
as from September, mainly as"the result of changes which took place in the 
international market. 
The application of a very similar exchange;policy,: in Uruguay did not, , 
however, prevent inflation from fce-ëmet'gimg with vigour in that country and 
rising from 46% in 1978 to 83% in 1979. As in the case of Argentina, the 
Central Bank of Uruguay announced in January the rates of : ex change,, ¡at which , 
it would buy or sell foreign currency in the course of the year*: 
Simultaneously, and with the same aim of moderating expectations as to the, 
future course of inflation, a programme of wage increases and the increases 
which would occur in public service tariffs was published. ' However, after 
a few months it was necessary to change the increases programmed in wages 
and salaries and tariffs since real inflation not only appreciably exceeded 
that anticipated but was also much higher than that registered, the previous 
year. There were three main factors which influenced this speeding up of 
inflation and the frustration of the policy aimed at reducing it. The first 
was a rise far larger than anticipated in international inflation and 
particularly the increase of over 47% in the average price in dollars paid, by 
Uruguay for its imports of oil. The second was the still larger increase 
(58%) in 1979 in the price of meat exports, the bull effect of which on the 
/domestic price 
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domestic price of this product which carries great weight in the consumer 
price index was strengthened by the libèralization of trade in it. Lastly, 
the third and most important factor in the exacerbation of inflation was the 
very considerable growth of aggregate dêraand* This increased not only 
because of the far more dynamic evolution of consumption-and domestic 
investment but also because of the exceptional iriérease in the purchases 
made by Argentinian tourists and the substantial investments in the 
construction sector by residents of that country, all of these operations 
which were strongly stimulated by the very uneven evolution of the real 
exchange rate in both cotintries; 
In contrast to the experiences of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Chile, 
where the exchange policy substantially influenced the course of inflation, 
the resurgence of inflation in Colombia, the maintenance of a high rate of 
inflation in Peru and above all the notablè speeding up of the rate of price-
growth in Venezuela were affected far more severely by the decisions aimed 
at correcting some distortions in the price system. 
The effect of the readjustment of a considerable number of prices 
which had lagged behind in previous years was particularly'strong in 
Venezuela. In that country, as aresultof'thè extraordinary increase in 
earnings caused by the exceptional rise in the intérnatitohal price of oil 
in 1974, and with the aim of diminishing the inflationary effects of the 
consequent rise in demand, the system of fixing and monitoring prices was 
extended and considerably strengthened as from that year and subsidies 
multiplied. Although these measures contributed to moderating the raté of 
inflation of the-next few years, they also generated substantial' 
disequilibria'in the price system and distortions in the allocation of 
resources and also required the disbursement of far larger funds for 
financing the system of subsidies; However, this policy underwent a radical 
change in mid-1979 when the new authorities adopted a sériés of measures 
aimed" at liberalizing the functioning of the price system by reducing the 
fiscal load which the subsidies represented. In line with this policy, 
price control was only maintained over those products which were considered 
most essential or which were produced or marketed in rather uncompetitive 
markets. This meant that of the 158 items controlled "òr regulated up to 
: r /that time, 
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that time, only 37 remained under control and none were regulated. The 
immediate consequence of this policy and of the simultaneous suppression 
of some subsidies was a sharp rise in prices, particularly of food and clothing. 
These increased steeply as from August and by the end of 1979 were 34 and 
40% higher, respectively, than-a year earlier» The consumer price index in 
turn rose by slightly over 20% in the course of the year, while wholesale 
prices increased by 40%, thus,tripling.in both cases their variations in 1978. 
The measures to correct seme distortions in the price system also 
influenced - although to a much lesser degree than in Venezuela - the 
increase in inflation in Colombia, which in 1979 achieved an almost 
unprecedented rate of nearly 30%, which amply exceeded that of slightly under 
18% registered the previous year. Partly as a consequence of the policy of 
gradually raising domestic fuel prices to a; level closer to that of their 
international price, and partly because of the increase in the latter during 
1979, the price of the fuels and lubricants included in the wholesale price 
index rose by 63%, that of petroleum products by 73% and that of transport 
and communications in the consumer price index ;by 47%. The inflationary 
effect of these increases on production costs was reinforced by that stemming 
from the readjustment in minimum real wages, which went up at the beginning 
of 197.9 by. nearly 34% in the metropolitan areas, over 30% in. the urban centres 
and nearly 43% in primary activities. f> 
The corrective readjustments in the price system also affected the 
rate of inflation in Peru, which only dropped from 74% in 1978 to 67% in 1979, 
despite the maintenance of a restrictive wage policy-, the constraint on 
domestic credit in real terms and a marked cut in the fiscal deficit. In 
fact, the anti-inflationary consequences of these policies were countered to 
a considerable extent by those stemming from the reduction of the average 
of the price control system, the readjustments in the official prices of a 
series of basic consumer goods and services, the increases decreed for the 
prices of energy and petroleum products and the tendency to bring the 
domestic prices of certain goods to the same level as were obtained by their 
producers in selling them abroad; these in turn rose considerably as a result 
of the substantial subsidies granted to exports. 
/The factors 
The factors determining the sharp increase in» inflation in the 
Dominican Republic and the exceptional increase of over 70% in the level 
,of consumer prices in Nicaragua were, hotréver, vëry different. 
In the former- country: - where the raté'òf price increases rose from 
less than 2% in 197,8 to over 26% in 1979 - the main reason why the pace of 
inflation increased was the damage caused "by a series of natural disasters. 
These began in the middle of the year with heavy rains and floods which mainly 
affected agriculture, continued in August when hurricane David devastated 
one of the country's richest rural regions, and concluded at the beginning 
of September when tropical storm Fredrick caused further floods in the cane 
plantations and the areas devoted to crops for domestic Consumption, caused 
damage in irrigation canals, roads' and buildings and occasioned losses in 
livestock and poultry. As' a result of this damage, agricultural supply 
dropped sharply and the government increased its spending so as to facilitate 
the reconstruction of the areas and activities devastated. Both facts 
contributed to generating large-scale increases in prices in the last few 
months of the year and the: first had ^particularly marked effect on the 
prices of food, which were nearly'42% higher' at the end oí 1979 than a year 
•earlier.̂  - .b.-' ••  ; •'••'.'• •••' "••' 
In Nicaragua'^ the-sharp rise ih thé rkte dî'inflation from slightly 
over 4% in 1978 to 70% in 1979 basically constituting a coñsequencé of the 
socio-political conflict which began in 1978 and culminated in July' with the 
overthrow of the prévious government following a bloody civil war. During 
the first five months of the year prices rose by 26% mainly as a consequence 
of the,devaluation of the córdoba by-more than-40% adopted in April and a 
growing lack of supply of both domestic and imported products. Moreover, 
when warlike activities throughout the country , became more widespread and 
more acute these prices only in June rose by 43%; 
The accumulated increase in prices in the first half of the year was 
thus over 84%. However, this trend was inverted when the new government took 
over, partly because it endeavoured through State intervention to freeze the 
prices of certain basic articles, partly owing to a relative improvement in 
food supply and partly thanks tó thè donations rèceived in kind from abroad. 
During the second half of the year, therefore, consumer prices dropped by 
nearly 8%. 
Table 1 
GROWTH RATES OF WORLD COMMODITY PRODUCTION 
1963-
1973 1971 1975 1976 1977 ' 1978 1979(a) 
Total 6.1 2.8 -1.1 7.1 4.6 4.4 3.0 
Agriculture 2.5 1.6 3.1 2.2 1.5 3.6 
Mining. 5.5 1.8 -1.7 5.9 5.5 2.1 2.0 
Manufacturing 7.0 3.1 -1.5 8.0 5.1 4.9 5.0 
Source: Derived from data in GATT, International Trade, 1978-1979, Geneva, 1979, table I k.1, and 
GATT, Press Release No. 1 256, February 1980. 
(a) Preliminary figures. 
Table 2 
WORLD: GROWTH RATES OF OUTPUT 
1967-
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979(a) 
Industrialized countries (b) 4.4 6.3 0.5 -0.4 5.2 3.7 3.9 3.3 
United States 3.0 5.4 -1.3 -1.0 5.5 4.8 . 4.4 2.3 
West Germany 5.2 4.9 0.5 -2.1 5.6 2.8 3.5 4.4 
Japan 10.4 9.8 -1.0 2.4 6.0 5.4 5.6 6.1 
United Kingdcs 1.8 8.0 -1.5 -1.0 3.7 1.3 3.3 0.8 
France 5.8 5.4 3.2 0.2 4.9 2.8 3.3 3.0 
Major oil exporters (c) 9.0 10.7 8.0 -0.3 12.8 6.2 2.6 2.0 
Non-oil exporting developing 
countries (d) 6.1 7.3 5.3 4.1 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.1 
Africa (e) 5.0 2.2 5.6 2.3 4.7 4.0 3.7 • ® 0 
Asia 4.8 7.9 2.7 6.1 5.8 6.6 6.9 • • • 
Latin America 6.8 8.1 7.7 2.6 4.8 4.3 4.3 6.5(f) 
Middle East (g) 8.8 4.8 -1.0 8.4 2.8 5.9 6.5 ... 
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook, No. 26, December 1979; IMF, Annual Report, 1979; UNCTAD, 
World Economic Outlook. 1980-1981, TD/B/783, March, 1980; and CEPAL calculations. 
(a) Preliminary figures. 
(b) OECD member countries. 
(c) Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya„ Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. 
(d) Members of the IMF. 
(5) Includes South Africa. 
(f) Estimate by CEPAL. 
(g) Includes Israel. 
Table 3 




OECD (b) 3.0 4.9 5.1 
United States 4.4 6.8 5.7 
Japan 1.2 1.9 2.2 
West Germany 0.7 3.2 3.0 
France 2.2 4.3 6.1 
United Kingdom 3.1 4.9 5.6 
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook, No. 26, December 1979, p.26. 
Ta5 Third quarter of 1979. 
(b) Represents about 90 per cent of the OECD area. 
Table 10 
COMERCIAL BANK LENDING RATES TO PRIME BORROWERS 
IN SELECTED INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES 
(End of December figures, percentages) 
1976 1977 1978 1979 
United States 6. 00 7.75 11.75 15.25 
Japan 7. 42 5.47 4.50 6.31 
West Germany 6. 50 6.00 5.50 9.75 
France 11. 65 11.35 10.95 13.65 
United Kingdom 15. 50 8.00 13.50 18.00 
Source: Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, World Financial 
Markets, January 1980, p. 20. 
Table 5 
INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES: CONSUMER PRICES 
(Percentage annual average change) 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 ( 
Industrialized 
countries (b) 5.6 5.3 4.8 7.9 13.4 11.4 8.6 8.7 7.9 8.5 
United States 5.9 373 3.3 O 11.0 9.1 5.8 6.5 7.7 11.3 
West Germany 3.4 5.3 5.5 6.9 7.0 6.0 4.5 3.9 2.6 4.1 
Japan 7.7 6.1 4.5 11.7 24.5 11.8 9.3 8.1 3.8 3.6 
United Kingdom 6.4 9.4 7.1 9.2 16.0 24.2 16.5 15.9 8.3 13.4 
France 4.8 5.5 6.2 7.3 13.7 11.8 9.6 9.4 9.1 10.7 
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook, No. 26, December 1979; IMF, International Financial Statistics, 
April 1980, and UNCTAD, World Economic Outlook, 1980-1981, TD/B/783, March 1980. 
(a) Preliminary figures. 
(b) 0ECD members. 
Table 6 
GROWTH RATES OF WORLD EXPORTS 
1964-
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979(a) 
Value 14.06 45.7 4.4 13.5 13.4 15.9 25.0 
Agriculture 10.4 22.3 1.4 10.7 13.9 12.7 
Minerals 14.0 124.0 -3.7 16.4 9.5 3.8 
Manufactures 15.5 32.3 9.2 13.0 14.5 21.6 
Unit value 4.9 41.0 7.5 2.1 8.8 10.0 18.0 
Agriculture 6.4 27.0 -4.3 2.2 10.9 5.1 
Minerals 6.7 131.8 3.4 10.9 7.8 2.4 
Manufactures 4.3 21.7 14.6 - 9.4 14.7 
Volume 8.7 3.5 -2.9 11.2 4.3 5.6 
Agriculture 3.9 -3.4 4.9 9.4 1.8 7.8 
Minerals 6.9 -2.6 -7.4 4.5 2.2 1.1 
Manufactures 10.9 8.6 -4.6 13.1 4.9 5.5 
Source: Derived from data in GATT, International Trade, 1978-1979, Geneva, 1979, table A.I, and 
GATT, Press Release, No. 1 256, 15 February 1980. 
(a) Preliminary estimates. 
Table 30 
EXPORTS, IMPORTS AND TRADE BALANCES (a) 
OF SELECTED GROUPS OF COUNTRIES (b) 
(Billion» of dollars) 
January-
September 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
1978 1979 
Industrialized countries (c) 
Exporta (FOB) 
<09 544 574 639 725 869 622 763 
Major oil exporters (d) 39 118 109 133 145 141 103 141 
Don-oil exporting developing 
countries (e) 67 98 94 116 135 153 111 142 
Industrialized countries (c) 
Imports (CIF) 
426 60¿ 602 694 787 908 655 832 
Major oil exporters (d) 20 34 51 63 84 99 70 66 
Non-oil exporting developing 
countries (e) 80 131 138 145 .61 196 142 175 
Trade balance 
Industrialized countries (c) -17 -62 -28 -55 -62 -39 -33 -69 
Major oil exporters (d) 19 84 58 70 61 42 33 75 
Don-oil exporting developing 
countries (e) -13 -33 -4l| -29 -26 -43 -31 -33 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, April 1980. 
Tal Goods. 
(b) Sue to unavailability of comparable data, these estimates exclude the centrally planned 
economies. The also exclude South Africa. 
(c) OECD members. 
(d) Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, United firab Emirates and 
Venezuela. 
(e) Members of IMF. 
i^y u" 
Table 8 
INDICES OF MARKET PRICES OF PRINCIPAL COMMODITY EXPORTS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
(Index, 1972 ̂  100) 
1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979(a) 
pood end tropical beverages 85 137 242 195 210 292 237 252 
Vegetable oilseeds and oils 117 180 316 184 179 232 260 301 
Agricultural raw materials 90 169 201 .165 197 210 232 285 
Minerals, ores and metals 114 145 202 170 167 176 187 241 
General Index 95 148 229 182 195 244 226 256 
Memorandum Item 
General index deflated by unit 
prices of manufactured exports 
of the Industrialized countries 107 125 160 113 120 139 111 112 
Source: Derived from data in UNCTAD, Monthly commodity price bulletin, UNCTAD/CD/CPB/92/Rev.2 and 
UNDTAD/CD/CPB/127; and United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, March 1980. 
(a) Preliminary estimates. 
Table 9 
CURRENT ACCOUNT OF BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
OF SELECTED GROUPS OF COUNTRIES (a) 
(Billions of dollars) 
1973 1971 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979(b) 
Industrialized countries (c) 19 -17 12 -6 -10 28 -9 
OPEP countries 6 68 35 40 32 6 60 
Non-oil exporting developing 
countries (d) -11 -30 -38 -26 -21 -31 -50 
Centrally planned economies 1 -4 -10 -7 -3 -7 -3 
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook, No. 26, December 1979; IMF, Annual Report, 1979! GATT, 
Press Release, No. 1 256, February 1980; and CEPAL on the basis of official data. 
(a) Goods, services and private transfers. Data are not directly comparable to those presented in 
table 7, due to different data sources and country groupings. (b) Preliminary figures. 
(c) OECD members. 
(d) Includes Israel and South Africa. 
Table 10 
DISBURSED COMMERCIAL BANK DEBT OF NON-OIL EXPORTING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (a)(b) 
1975 1976 1977 1978(b) 1979(c) 
Latin America 
Gross 38.D 51.1 56.6 79.4 89.9 
Net (d) 26.2 33.5 35.9 48.2 57.4 
Africa 
Gross 2.3 3.2 4.3 12.0 11.8 
Net (d) -1.1 -0.9 -1.2 5.5 4.3 
Asia 
Gross 11.1 13.0 16.9 25.4 29.9 
Net (d) 1-3 -0.2 -2.3 3.9 4.7 
Middle East (e) 
Gross 1.0 1.5 1.4 3.1 3.2 
Net (d) -2.0 -2.3 -4.0 -4.4 -4.3 
Eastern Europe 
Gross 12.2 15.6 20.0 34.5 37.4 
Net (d) 8.7 12.4 16.8 29.8 32.2 
Memorandum item 
World (f) 
Gross «41.7 547.6 657.3 903.0 1 041.5 
Source: Derived from annual reports and periodic statements of the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS). 
(a) Includes short-term debt. Country groups exclude offshore financial centres and residual 
estimates of the BIS. 
(b) Xear-to-year growth rates can be due in part to increased reporting by the banks. In the year 
1978 there was a marked expansion of coverage. 
(c) Preliminary data for September 1979. 
(d) Total debt less deposits in the banks. 
(•) Excludes Israel. 
(f) Includes Industrialized countries, oil exporters and offshore financial centres as well as 
the non-oil exporting developing countries. 
Table 11 
PUBLICIZED EUROCREDITS 
(Millions of dollars or equivalent) > 





Total 28 508 20 554 28 703 3« 185 72 025 48 557 
Industrialized countries (b) 19 531 6 591 10 960 13 786 34 710 16 920 
Developing oil exporters 794 3 213 3 683 6 125 10 618 6 471 
Non-oil developing countries 6 562 7 179 10 559 11 246 21 977 17 692 
Centrally planned countries 1 115 2 663 2 371 2 691 3 744 6 357 
Others 506 908 1 130 337 976 1 117 
Memorandum item 
Developing countries as 
percentage of total 25.8 50.6 49.6 50.8 U5.3 49.8 
Non-oil developing countries 
as percentage of total 23.0 34.9 36.8 32.9 30.5 36.U 
Source: Derived from data in World Bank, Borrowing In International Capital Markets (various 
issues). 
(a) Preliminary figures. 
(b) OECD plus South Africa. 
Table 10 
Total 
Industrialized countries (b) 
Developing oil exporters 
Hon-oil developing countries 
Centrally planned economies 
International organizations 
Others 
Source: Derived from data in 
issues). 
(a) Preliminary figures. 
(b) OECD members plus South 
INTERNATIONAL BOND PLACEMENTS 
(Millions of dollars or equivalent) 
January-
September 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 (a) 
1979 
12 275 22 821 34 311 36 094 37 316 29 697 
5 908 16 174 23 573 23 536 23 332 20 185 
67 68 177 794 1 865 414 
161 454 1 366 2 751 2 868 2 135 
40 201 72 256 30 48 
5 390 5 330 8 256 7 160 8 425 6 281 
709 594 867 1 597 796 63« 
World Bank, Borrowing In International Capital Markets (various 
Africa. 
Table 13 
AVERAGE WEIGHTED SPREAD ON VARIABLE-INTEREST EUROCURRENCY 









Up to 0.50 _ 0.2 1.5 4.1 8.1 7.5 
0.501 - 1.00 - • 19.1 46.0 62.1 73.6 73.7 
1.001 - 1.50 37.7 32.8 28.6 37.6 30.7 13.5 14.9 
1.501 - 2.00 59.1 58.9 46.4 12.1 2.2 3.8 4.0 
2.001 - 2.25 2.6 7.0 3.0 1.7 0.2 0.3 = 
2.251 and over 0.2 1.2 2.6 0.3 0.5 0.2 
Unknown 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.2 0.5 » 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Derived from data in World Bank, Borrowing 'In International Capital Markets, (various 
issues). 
(a)j Note that the World Bank classification of developing countries employed in this table 
Includes countries previously classified as OECD members, such as Spain, Portugal, Turkey 
and Greece. 
Table 14 
AVERAGE WEIGHTED MATURITY OF EUROCURRENCY LOANS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (a) 
(Percentage distribution) 
Years of 1979 
maturity 1975 1976 1977 1978 =<*— — — 
I II III 
1 - 3 5.7 2.3 3.9 2.8 5.6 5.7 4.2 
3 - 5 62.9 54.8 19.4 5.0 2.5 4.0 5.8 
5 - 7 24.1 30.0 63.9 27.4 3.6 6.8 10.1 
7 - 1 0 3.3 4.5 8.8 55.2 637 67.5 60.5 
10 and over 1.7 - - 6.3 148 9.4 14.0 
Unknown 2.3 8.5 4.0 3-4 9.8 6.6 5.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100 0 100.0 100.0 
Source: World Bank, Borrowing In International Capital Markets, (various .ssues). 
(a) Note that the World Bank classification of developing countries employed in this table 
includes countries previously classified as OECD members, such as Sp.iin, Portugal, Turkey and 
Greece. 
Table 15 
ANNUAL RANGE OF MONTHLY EURODOLLAR 
BASE INTEREST RATE (a) 
(Per cent) 
Highest Lowest 
Year monthly monthly 
rate rate 
197*1 11.06 8.50 
1975 8.69 6.63 
1976 7.25 5.31 
1977 7.50 5.1« 
1978 12.31 7.62 
1979 (b) 12.75 10.50 
Source: World Bank, Borrowing In International 
Capital Markets, (various issues). 
(a) Prime banks six months bid rates in London. 
(b) January-September. 
Table 16 
MEXICAN AND VENEZUELAN PROPOSALS FOR RESOURCE TRANSFERS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Features Mexican long-term 
recycling facility 
Venezuelan plan for 
joint OPEC/OECD 
global stimulation 
Amount/Size US* 15 billion Not specified, but in ranger of 
20-10 billion 
Timeframe Long term 5-10 years, commencing before 
1980 
Objective To increase the supply of long-
term funds to the LDCs for fi-
nancing capital goods purchases. 
To mobilize unused savings in 
OPEC and the OECD into a capital 
pool and to invest these funds 
in the non-oil LDCs in such a 
way as to increase their pur-
chases of exports from the in-
dustrial nations; to head off 
medium-term international sup-
ply shortages; and to implement 
structural adjustment plans in 
the OECD. 
Problea Focus 1. Low long-term growth rates in 1. 
DCs are slowing world trade, 
fostering protectionism, and 
leading to sluggish demand for 
capital goods of DCs. 
2. LDCs have potential demand for 
capital goods not made effec-
tive for lack of financing. 
3. The high level of financing by 2. 
the international banking sys-
tem cannot be sustained in the 3. 
future. 
1. There are short- and medium-
term recycling facilities for 
balance-of-payments adjust-
ments but none for the longer 4. 
term. 
With simultaneous unemploy-
ment and inflation together 
with declining profitability 
and productivity in DC indus-
tries, OECD capital formation 
is lagging and there is a 
trend towards long-term stag-
nation. 
OPEC recycling could be 
longer-term. 
There are serious policy lags 
in DCs and LDCs regarding ma-
cro-economic management and 
international economic coor-
dination. 
The Third World could be a 
new source of sustained de-
mand -a new growth frontier-
for the world economy. 
There is a need to alleviate 
the poverty and debt problems 
of the LDCs. 
Sources of Funds Public and private investors of 
countries with strong balance-
of-payments and financial posi-
tions (including institutional 
investors). 
1. Underutilized savings in OPEC 
and OECD: 20-252 from OPEC's 
accumulated petrodollar earn-
ings, and the rest from pri-
vate investors. 
2. Contributions from OECD na-
tions to World Bank (addi-
tional or reallocation). 
Administration of Funds New lending 
World Bank. 
operation at the Special window 
and IFC, and/or 
tutions. 
at World Bank 
regional insti-
Main Characteristics 1. OPEC money would be raised 
through the issue of "OPEC 
Development Bonds" in inter-
national capital markets. 
OPEC would purchase 20-25$ 
of the total subscription of 
long-term Triple A bonds (12-
20 years maturities). 
2. The remainder would be sold 
to private investors in ca-
pital markets. 
3. OPEC would act as first 
guarantor, with the World Bank 
family as the second. 
4. Funds would be targeted to 
purchases in OECD sectors 
operating at low capacity 
utilization levels; in the 
medium term funds would be 
targeted to international sec-
tors where supply shortages 
are likely. 
5. In the third year, intensified 
domestic structural adjustment 
efforts would commence. 
6. About 20-25? of the funds 
would go to poorest LDCs. 
1= Total capital subscription of 
the facility could be divided 
into three borrowing oper-
ations of US$ 5 billion each. 
2. Debt instruments denominated 
in SDRs would be issued to 
lenders for a 15-year term 
with a market rate of in-
terest. 
3. Secondary market would be de-
veloped to give liquidity to 
these instruments. 
Governments not contributing 
direct loans could guarantee 
loans granted by the facility. 
5. Purchases of DC capital goods 
financed by the facility would 
be limited to countries grant-
ing loans or guarantees. 
6. Capital goods would be pur-
chased in connexion with spe-
cific projects approved in 
LDCs by the World Bank. Loans 
could be extended to national 
private firms operating in 
LDCs. 
Sector Investment Focus 1. Basic need projects in the 
poorest LDCs (20-25? of 
funds). 
2. Projects that generate a rate 
of return equivalent to that 
of AAA Bonds. 
3. Targeting in the short term 
of OECD industries operating 
at low capacity utilization. 
4. Targeting in the medium term 
on supply sectors where there 
could be shortages. 
Projects that require long-tern 





1. Would .increase OECD-wide 
capital formation. 
2. Would expand demand for goods 
from OECD industrial sectors 
with excess capacity. 
3. Would have positive employment 
impacts and be less inflation-
ary than current OECD domestic 
demand stimulation, because it 
would absorb liquid or near-
liquid assets, and would be 
targeted to OECD industrial 
sectors operating at low ca-
pacity utilization levels. 
4. Would alleviate the need for 
immediate structural adjust-
ment in many DCs. 
5. Would help LDCs' debt and 
poverty problems. 
(Middle-income LDCs). 
1. Would contribute to the sti-
mulation of capital goods sec-
tors in DCs that suffer from 
inadequate demand, and would 
also facilitate structural 
adjustments in DCs. 
2. Would provide necessary long-
term resources for LDCs to 
finance their demand for 
capital goods. 
3. Would provide an additional 
investment outlet for surplus 
countries. 
4. Would help develop a better 
structure of assets and lia-
bilities in the financial 
system. 
Source; Overseas Development Council. 
ÏSble 17 
LOTI AiERICA: MAD) EOCSOGC DffilCATCBS(a) 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1971 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979(b) 
Faprtr eccacalc lrtllcators 
Gross daaestic product at factor cost 
(hlllions of dollars at 1970 prices) 172 183 196 213 228 235 216 257 269 286 
Population (milliers) 265 273 280 287 291 302 310 318 32S 335 
Per capita gross dauestic product 
(dollars at 1570 prices) 618 673 702 711 773 778 792 808 821 857 
Growth rates 
Short-tenu economic Indicators 
Gross dauestic product 6.9 6.9 7.0 8.3 7.0 3.3 1.6 1.6 1.7 6.5 
Per capita grass dauestic product 1.0 1.1 1.3 5.5 1.3 0.6 1.9 1.9 2.0 1.0 
Trams of trade 3.3 -2.6 3.0 12.5 15.0 -12.1 1.6 2.1 -10.0 1.8 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 8.6 1.1 15.7 38.6 51.3 -5.1 11.7 17.1 10.2 31.0 
Current valua of imports of goods 
and services 13.7 10.3 13.0 28.2 61.1 7.6 1.3 13.1 11.7 25.9 
Consune? price indat (c) 12.2 13.3 21.2 37.0 10.7 60.3 61.3 11.9 10.5 51.9 
Millions of dollars 
External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) -481 -1 633 -1 51 621 -2 095 -8 519 -4 171 -2 813 -5 91« -1 033 
Oil-sqportii® countries (d) -118 285 13 1 338 5 900 79 -175 -2 005 Jt 336 402 
Noivoil-gcpcrting oouitries -366 -1 918 -1 397 -718 -7 995 -8 597 -3 998 -808 -1 578 -1 435 
Balance on current aeaxmt -3 285 -it 745 -4 506 -3 611 -7 190 -11 205 -10 887 -11 217 -16 329 -18 317 
Oil-acporting oouitries (d) -1 387 -1 185 -1 315 -622 3 311 -2 032 -2 509 -1 925 -8 217 -4 831 
ffon-oil-ex porting oouitries -1 898 -3 560 -3 191 -2 989 -10 505 -12 173 -a 379 -6 292 -8 112 -13 486 
Balance of passants position 1 35« 608 3 108 -1 178 1 282 772 3 608 1 319 6 041 7 1«3 
Oil-ecporting oountries (d) 180 632 186 832 5 060 3 270 -47« 755 -1 287 1 903 
Non-oil-ecporting oountries 1 171 -21 2 622 -3 616 -778 -2 498 4 OS 3 564 7 328 5 240 
Soiree: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
(a) Ths figires for the product, population and incane relate to the group of 21 countries included in table 18; the figures 
for the external sector and prices relate to the sane group of countries plis Barbados, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago. 
(b) Preliminary figures. 
(c) Variation fran December to Decanber. 
(d) Unlike the classification used in earlier Econcmlc Surveys, in Khich Mexico tas included ancstg non-oil-arportins 
oouitries, in the present Survey Mexico is included ip the group of oil-ecporting countries. 
Cuad ro 18 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF THE CROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
(Growth rates) 
1970-1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979(a) 
Argentina 4.9 -0.9 -1.7 1.9 -3.1 8.5 
Bolivia 5.8 5.3 6.8 4.0 3.3 1.5 
Brazil 11.5 5.7 9.0 1.7 6.0 6.1 
Colombia 6.9 1.3 4.2 4.7 8.8 5.3 
Costa Rica 7.1 2.1 5.5 8.9 5.7 1.3 
Cuba (b) 8.7(c) 12.3 3.5 3.1 8.2 2.1 
Chile 2.6 -11.3 4.1 8.6 7.8 8.5 
Ecuador 8.1 7.5 8.1 6.4 5.1 5.1 
El Salvador 1.9 5.6 4.0 5.9 1.1 -3.1 
Guatemala 6.4 1.9 7.4 7.8 5.5 5.0 
Haiti 4.7 2.2 5.3 1.3 3.9 1.9 
Honduras 3.1 -1.9 6.1 5.8 7.9 5.1 
Jamaica -2.5 -8.3 -1.9 -1.7 -2.0 
Mexico 6.2 4.1 2.1 3.3 7.0 8.0 
Nicaragua 5.3 2.2 5.0 6.3 -7.2 -21.8 
Panama 5.2 0.6 -1.1 3.3 3.8 4.9 
Paraguay 6.4 5.0 7.5 11.8 10.3 9.0 
Peru 6.6 3.3 3.0 -1.2 -1.8 3.8 
Dominican Republic 10.1 5.2 6.7 5.5 2.3 3.6 
Uruguay 0.8 4.4 2.6 3.4 3.9 8.1 
Venezuela 5.2 5.2 7.8 7.6 1.8 1.1 
Total (d) 7.2 3.2 4.6 1.6 1.7 6.5 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
(a) Preliminary figures subject to revision. 
(b) Growth rates refer to the material product, which is the sum of the value of gross out put of 
the agricultural, mining, manufacturing, construction and electricity sectors. 
(c) 1971-1971. 
(d) Excluding Cuba and Jamaica. 
Table 10 
LATIN AKESICA: EVOLUTION OF THE PER CAPITA GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
Dollars at 1970 prices Growth rates 
1970 1975 1979(a) 1970-1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979(0) 
Argentina 1 208 1 369 1 405 3.8 -2.2 -3.0 3.6 -4.7 7.1 
Bolivia 294 344 362 3.3 2.4 4.1 1.4 0.7 -1.1 
Breill 450 662 773 8.6 3.1 6.3 2.1 3.5 3.9 
Coloabia 528 642 728 4.4 1.9 1.7 2.2 6.2 2.7 
Costa Rica 658 777 895 4.4 -0.3 3.0 6.3 3.3 1.8 Chile 850 759 937 0.8 -12.8 2.8 6.8 6.0 6.7 
Ecuador 368 470 532 5.0 4.4 4.9 3.2 2.3 2.2 
El Salvador 390 440 436 1.8 2.5 1.0 2.8 1.4 -5.9 
Guatemala 410 «62 525 3.1 -1.2 4.2 4.6 2.4 1.9 
Haiti 112 123 126 2.4 -0.1 2.9 -1.1 1.5 -0.5 
Honduras 280 267 294 -0.1 -5.2 2.6 2.0 4.1 1.4 
Mexico 893 999 1 066 2.8 0.7 -1.2 -0.1 3.5 4.4 
Nicaragua 394 439 300 2.0 -1.1 1.6 2.8 -10.2 -27.2 
Panama 865 924 932 2.4 -2.1 -3.5 0.7 1.3 2.4 
Paraguay 355 «19 532 3.6 2.0 4.4 8.6 7.1 5.9 
Peru 521 603 561 3.8 0.6 0.2 -3.8 -4.4 1.0 
Doalniean itepublic 337 W9 483 6.9 2.3 3.9 2.8 -0.3 1.0 
Uruguay 948 977 1 142 0.6 4.2 2.2 2.8 3.3 7.7 
Venezuela 1 163 1 2 W 1 380 1.7 1.7 4.3 4.1 1.4 0.8 
Total 647 778 857 4.5 0.6 1.9 1.9 2.0 4.0 
Source: CEPAL, estimates on the basis of official figures, 
Tâ5 Preliminary figures. 
Table 20 
LATIN AMERICA: TOTAL SUPPLÌ AND DEMAND 
Growth rates (a) 
1970-1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979(b) 
Total supply 7.6 2 .8 U.1 4.9 5.0 7.0 
Gross domestic product 7.2 3.2 4.6 4.6 Ï7T 6.5 
Imports of goods and services 10.7 -1.3 -1.2 7.9 8.3 11.4 
Total demand 7.6 2.8 4.1 4.9 5.0 7.0 
Domestic demand O 3.3 3^8 4.5 5.0 O 
Gross fixed investment 8.7 9.7 4.4 5.2 5 . 5 8.0 
Total consumption (c) 7.7 1.6 3.6 4.3 4.0 6.4 
Exports of goods and services 3.9 -3-1 8.9 10.0 12.9 ' 9.7 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
la) Calculated on the basis of constant 1970 values. 
(b) Preliminary figures. 
(c) Includes changes in stocks. 
Table 21 
LATIN AMERICA: RELATIVE SHARES OF THE COMPONENTS OF EXPENDITURE 









1970 80.6 19.6 9.0 9.2 
1971 80.5 19.9 8.6 9.0 
1972 80.3 20,1 8.6 9.0 
1973 80.3 20.« 8.7 9.4 
1974 81.4 21.0 8.2 10.6 
1975 80.2 22.3 7.7 10.2 
1976 79.4 22.2 8.0 9.6 
1977 79.2 22.3 8.4 9.9 
1978 78.7 22.5 9.0 10.2 
1979 78.6 22.8 9.3 10.7 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data, 
(a) Includes changes in stocks. 
Table 10 
LAHM AMERICA: EVOLÜTM OF THE MAIN ECOHMTC SECTORS 
(Growth rates) 
Agriculture Mining and quarrying Sfenufacturing Construction Subtotal goods (b) Basic services (c) Other services (d) 
1977 1978 1979(a) 1977 1978 1979(a) 1977 1978 1979(a) 1977 1978 1979(a) 1977 1978 1979(a) 1577 1978 1979(a) 1S77 1978 1979(a) 
Argentina 1.2 1.7 5.0 9.5 0.7 4.3 4.2 -7.9 11.0 14.6 0.7 4.9 4.8 -4.2 8.4 5.8 -1.3 8.8 4.8 -0.6 6.7 
Bolivia -3-4 2.3 -1.0 -2.5 -7.1 -8.0 6.1 5.3 2.8 5.9 4.7 2.5 0.9 2.1 -0.2 13.6 6.3 3.1 5.0 4.1 3.1 
Brazil 9.6 -1.7 3.2 -4.7 6.1 9.9 2.3 7.6 7.0 9.1 9.7 3.8 4.4 6.2 5.9 6.8 8.5 10.9 2.6 5.3 
Colombia 2.5 9.0 4.8 -3.8 4.4 -1.5 4.2 8.4 5.8 5.7 1.9 -4.0 3-3 8.1 4.4 6.5 11.5 5.5 6.1 9.0 6^3 
Costa Rica 2.2 3.7 -0.1 (e) (e) (e) 12.7(e) 6.0(e) 4.2(e) 3.9 5.8 • • « 6.5 4.9 • • • 10.6 11.1 • • • 9.6 5.7 
Chile 14.1 -0.5 8.6 2.0 -0.3 2.8 12.2 7.8 8.8 3.5 2.5 25.8 9.0 3.7 7.9 7.6 6.0 7.8 6.4 8.5 8^9 
Ecuador 1.4 1.0 2.0 -6.8 9.8 5.7 14.0 12.1 10.0 4.1 5.0 2.4 4.7 6.2 5.4 11.4 8.1 7.8 6.7 4.7 5.0 
El Salvador 3.6 6.9 1.7 -8.4 -11.5 3.0 5.5 3.0 -7.5 35.6 6.2 -11.2 7.0 5.3 -3.0 8.7 5.0 -0.4 4.1 3.5 -2.9 
Guatemala 3.9 3.9 3.7 14.8 80.6 25.5 10.7 6.7 5.6 12.4 2.9 2.7 6.6 4.9 4.3 11.0 7.6 5.5 7.7 5.5 5.5 
Haiti -0.4 4.9 2.0 -4.7 -9.8 - 2.8 1.8 4.5 8.2 5.9 2.0 0.7 4.0 2.4 4.3 8.0 4.6 3.8 2.9 
Honduras 7.1 5.1 7.0 -3.3 3.5 3.1 9.6 10.4 5.8 6.5 9.8 6.6 7.3 7.2 6.4 4.1 9.6 4.7 4.2 8.6 3*6 
Mexico 5.1 3.6 1.5 13.9 10.7 12.5 3.4 9.0 8.6 -2.0 13.3 11.5 4.1 8.5 7.9 6.5 10.3 11.9 1.6 5.0 7-6 
Nicaragua 3.6 6.5 -13.0 -3.7 -22.3 26.8 7.8 -0.1 -27.3 »1.7 =41.3 =76.7 4.5 -1.0 -22.2 9.0 -15.8 -16.0 7.5 -10.6 -28.1 
Panana 7.7 -0.4 -1.4 8.8 -10.4 3.0 1.0 1.3 5.4 0.2 -3.8 4.1 4.4 -0.4 1.4 9.6 8.8 14.4 1.3 5.3 3-5 
Paraguay 9.4 6.0 5.8 24.1 74.8 42.1 18.4 8.2 5.5 31.7 32.0 30.0 14.2 9.3 8.9 9.5 11.7 13.6 9.5 11.3 9.0 
Peru -0.4 -0.8 3.5 27.2 13.5 11.7 -6.5 -2.1 4.0 -7.7 -16.1 " 3.7 -0.4 -0.7 5.3 (f) (f) (f) -1.4(f) -2.8(f) 2.1(f) 
Daninican 
Republic 1.7 6.5 -2.7 -1.2 -19.3 24.0 5.7 -0.6 2.0 16.8 2.8 3.2 4.8 0.2 2.5 13.2 4.1 2.7 4.5 4.7 5.2 
Urugiay -1.6 -3.6 3.3 (e) (e) (e) 6.3(e) 6.0(e) 10.1(e) 14.6 10.8 19.9 4.9 4.0 9.6 4.3 4.5 6.1 2.0 3.8 8.3 
Venezuela 7.6 6.6 5.0 -4.8 -3.5 9.6 4.1 5.3 4.6 24.6 10.2 1.0 5.7 4.4 4.7 11.6 7.8 7.0 8.1 4.1 2.5 
Total 4.7 2.8 3.2 5.4 4.5 9.2 3.5 4.8 7.6 7.7 7.8 5.5 4.4 4.6 6.3 7.1 6.4 8.8 3.4 4.3 5.7 
Source: CEF'AL, on the basis of official data. 
7a) Preliminary figures. 
(b) Includes agriculture, mining and quarrying, manufactiring and construction. 
(c) Includes electricity, gas and water, and transport and ccmmuiicatAons. 
(d) Includes ccmmerce, restaurants and hotels; financial institutions, insurance and real estate; canmnity, social and personal services. 
(e) Mining and quarrying are included in manufacturing. 
(f) Includes basic services. 
Table 23 
UTIH AMERICA: VARIATIONS IN EXPORTS AND IMFORTS OF GOODS 
(Growth rates) 
Exports Imports 
Value Volume Unit value Valua Voltate Unit value 
Latin America 
1970 9.1 1.3 7.7 13.4 8.7 4.3 1971 2.1 -0.1 2.3 11.1 5.8 5.0 1972 15.8 6.4 8.9 14.2 8; 1 5.7 1973 42.« 8.0 31.8 30.7 11.6 17.2 1971 60.3 -1.2 62.3 72.0 21.9 41.1 1975 -7.3 -3.6 -3.9 6.5 -2.8 9.6 1976 15.5 7.8 7.1 3.6 -1.6 5.3 1977 18.1 8.4 8.9 13.7 7.0 6.3 1978 7.4 11.4 -3.6 11.5 4.2 7.1 1979(a) 33.5 10.9 20.4 26.4 9.9 15.0 
1970 
Oll-exporting countries 
5.0 2.2 2.7 6.5 1.9 4.5 1971 14.9 -2.7 18.1 13.9 7.6 5.8 1972 5.2 1.5 3.7 13.8 7.1 6.2 
1973 46.9 6.7 37.6 16.9 0.5 16.4 1974 140.2 -8.2 161.6 70.9 25.3 36.4 1975 -18.1 (b) -20.7 (b) 3,3 (b) 22.8 (c) 11.8 (c) 9.9 (c) 1976 10.0 11.1 4.6 3.7 5.Ï 7.1 27.7 12.3 17.8 4.3 8.« 7.6 1977 3.7 9.5 -7.0 3.2 11.4 6.2 31.3 19.4 22.1 11.5 7.6 7.1 1978 -3.1 7.6 -1.9 15.1 -1.2 -6.5 6.8 15.9 -2.5 7.7 9.5 7.7 1979(a) 45.9 45.9 1.7 7.8 43.5 35.3 1.1 17.5 -7.2 8.7 8.9 8.1 
Non-oil-exporting countries 
1970 10.5 1.0 9.4 15.1 10.4 4.3 1971 -1.8 0.8 -2.6 10.4 5.3 4.8 1972 19.7 7.9 11.0 14.3 8.' 5.5 1973 41.0 8.4 30.0 34.0 14.2 17.4 
1974 33.3 0.7 32.3 72.3 21.? 42.1 
1975 -0.8 (b) 0.8 (b) -1.6 (b) 3.1 (c) -6.0 (c) 9.7 (c) 
4.4 1976 18.2 18.6 8.4 9.3 9.0 8.5 -2.3 -1.0 -6.6 -5.2 «.5 1977 24.8 23.8 11.4 10.3 12.0 12.3 8.0 10.2 2.1 4.0 5.8 6.0 1978 11.5 7.3 13.6 10.2 -1.8 -2.7 13.4 8.7 6.7 1.7 6.2 6.8 
1979(a) 29.3 26.1 12.1 11.9 15.3 12.7 35.8 32.6 15.9 10.8 17.2 19.7 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
7a5 Preliminary figures. 
(b) As of 1976, including Mexico. 
(c) A3 of 1976, excluding Mexico 
Table 2D 
UTIN AMERICA: VARIATIONS IN EXPORTS C7 GOODS 
(Growth rates)' 
Valus Volune Unit valua Purchasing poaar 
1977 1978 
1979 1979 1979 1979 (a) 1977 1978 (a) 1977 1978 (a) 1977 1978 (a) 
Latin Ane-lca 18.1 7.4 33.5 8.4 11.« 10.9 M -3J> 20.4 9.9 4.6 16.5 
0il-«porting 
countries 9.5 7.6 45.9 3.1 15.1 7.8 6.2 -6.5 35.3 1.9 7.6 28.1 Bolivia iO -2.6 21.5 -2.5 -12.6 -10.7 17.4 11.4 36.0 3.5 -8.1 3.7 Ecuador 7.2 9.4 39.9 -10.3 17.4 -3.5 19.5 -6.9 45.0 3.2 1.6 22.8 Mexico 32.4 40.3 45.9 20.4 37.6 13.6 10.0 2.0 28.4 8.1 32.7 24.6 Trinidad and 
Tobago 0.2 -2.5 17.7 -5.4 -2.5 -0.2 6.0 17.9 3.4 -10.1 6.1 Venezuela 3.4 -5.0 55.8 -7.1 -5.0 6.0 11.4 - 47.0 -3.8 -9.4 40.5 
No»-oil-exporting 
countries 23.8 7.3 26.1 10.3 10.2 11.9 12.3 -2.7 12.7 15.8 2.6 8.4 Argentina 1572 13.3 21.9 « O 5.2 4.« -2.7 7.7 T O ' 27.5 12.1 5.2 Barbados 19.4 22.2 34.3 19.6 16.« 19.8 -0.2 5.0 12.0 18.9 12.2 6.7 Brazil 19.6 4.4 22.4 7.2 12.2 11.3 11.6 -7.0 10.0 16.4 -1.2 4.4 Colombia 21.0 18.1 26.1 -24.1 38.1 32.7 59.4 -14.5 -5.0 12.3 6.8 9.9 Costa Rica 39.7 3.7 8.2 9.3 11.1 3.7 27.8 -6.7 4.4 27.1 -1.1 -4.1 Chile «.4 13.3 54.7 4.9 7.9 18.2 -0.5 4.9 30.9 1.7 11.1 22.4 El Salvador 30.6 -13.0 34.1 -3.2 2.3 38.2 35.0 -14.9 -3.0 22.2 -14.3 14.6 Guatanala 51.9 -5.1 5.9 12.6 -1.7 4.9 34.9 -3.5 1.0 33.4 -8.9 -8.9 Guyana -7.2 13.9 -1.8 -13.6 2.« -3.7 7.5 11.2 2.0 -12.6 9.6 -10.5 Haiti 24.0 13.8 -10.1 -24.5 10.« -11.8 64.1 3.1 2.0 16.7 10.7 -12.5 Honduras 28.7 18.2 19.8 2.9 16.8 11.5 25.0 1.2 7.4 16.2 12.5 10.6 Jamaica 15.2 1.7 3.5 8.7 1.7 -4.2 6.0 8.1 -1.4 -2.8 -5.0 Nicaragua 17.4 1.6 -12.2 -17.1 6.8 -14.5 41.6 -4.9 2.7 9.4 -1.9 -26.0 Panama 6.7 2.7 13.3 3.6 7.0 5.8 3.0 -4.1 7.2 2.2 -0.1 -0.5 Paraguay 62.3 8.0 18.8 20.4 18.5 11.1 34.8 -8.9 6.9 52.2 10.2 0.8 Peru 26.8 12.0 79.7 23.0 17.7 20.8 3.1 -4.8 48.7 1«.9 5.2 50.4 Dominican 
Republic 8.9 -13.4 32.2 -1.1 -10.8 5.4 10.2 -3.0 14.6 2.4 -16.6 21.8 Uruguay 8.2 12.2 14.9 -0.9 5.5 5.2 9.2 6.4 21.1 1«.8 -1.9 4.1 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
Tal Preliminary figures. 
Table 10 
LATIN AMERICA: VARIATIONS IN IMPORTS OF GOODS 
(Growth rates) 
Value Volume Unit value 
1979 1979 1979 
1977 1978 (a) 1977 1978 (a) 1977 1978 (a) 
Latin America 13-7 11.5 26.1 7.0 4.2 9.9 6 j 7.1 15.0 
Oil-exporting countries 19.» 15.9 17.5 11.5 7.7 8.7 7.1 7.7 8.1 Bolivia n r ? 22.7 T O 3.2 11.5 -1.3 11.0 10.0 1975 
Ecuador 29.8 -3.3 25.1 18.1 -7.9 8.7 10.0 1.9 15.1 
Mexico -2.5 38.7 49.1 5.4 28.5 33.4 3.0 8.0 11.7 
Trinidad and Tobago -9.6 10.2 0.7 15.5 3.9 -10.1 7.0 6.0 12.0 
Venezuela «3.3 6.6 -2.9 30.1 -3.V -10.0 10.2 10.0 7.8 
Non-oil-exporting 
countries 10.2 8.7 32.6 4.0 1.7 10.8 6.0 6.8 19.7 
Argentina 37.2 -7.6 74.3 22.5 -9.9 38.1 12.0 2.6 26.2 
Barbados 11.2 14.9 30.0 6.7 8.3 13.0 7.0 6.0 15.1 
Brazil -2.7 13.2 32.0 -5.3 5.8 9.6 2.8 7.0 20.1 
Colombia 18.9 39.1 17.8 8.0 27.6 1.1 10.0 9.0 12.9 
Costa Rica 33.0 15.2 19.2 26.3 8.8 1.5 5.3 5.9 11.0 
Chile 37.9 29.3 40.7 24.3 19.7 15.3 10.9 8.0 22.0 
El Salvador 25.8 10.7 0.6 12.3 5.4 -11.8 12.0 5.0 11.0 
Guatemala 18.9 5.8 23.5 8.8 -1.2 1.7 9.3 7.1 18.0 
Guyana -13.1 -11.6 15.6 18.3 -15.8 1.1 6.0 5.0 11.0 
Haiti 26.9 1.5 10.0 12.8 -2.3 -1.3 8.0 7.0 11.6 
Honduras 27.2 19.0 18.3 14.7 13.4 10.2 10.9 1.9 7.3 
Jamaica -15.7 12.6 14.4 -20.5 5.2 2.9 6.0 7.0 11.1 
Nicaragua 15.2 -21.1 -39.4 36.6 -28.6 -17.2 6.3 10.0 11.6 
Panama 1.1 8.8 28.2 -3.7 2.6 6.1 5.0 6.0 20.8 
Paraguay 52.1 19.9 43.5 42.3 16.6 20.8 6.8 2.9 18.8 
Peru 3.1 -26.1 30.7 -3.2 -31.5 11.7 6.5 8.0 17.0 
Dominican Republic 11.0 1.4 23.1 1.8 -6.1 11.3 6.0 8.0 10.5 
Uruguay 26.7 1.1 60.6 15.2 1.1 30.3 10.0 3.0 . 23.3 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data, 
(a) Preliminary figures. 
Table 26 
LAT3K NdICAN OIL-MORTING CONTRES: 3MF0RIS CF COTE PEmXEXM AMD KTKUHM PRODUCE 
1970(a) 1973 1971 1978 1979(b) 
Percent- Percsit- Percett- Percait- Peresit-
Millions age of Millions age of Millions age of Millions age of Killions age of 
of total of total of total of total of total 
dollars imports dollars imports dollars imports dollars imports dollars imports 
OF OF OF OF OF 
Argeitlna 80 1.7 141 6.3 169 12.8 472(b) 12.3 1 135(c) 17.0 
Barbados ... ... 19 9.3 38 17.6 53(a) 17.0 118(d) 28.9 
Brazil 377 13.2 986 14.1 3 233 22.8 4 617 30.7 6 898 35.1 
Colombia 4 0.5 4 0.4 3 0.2 374 12.8 671 15.1 
Costa Rica 11 3.5 30 6.6 63 8.8 112 9.5 186(d) 13.2 
Chile 56 6.0 69 6.3 216 12.9 454 14.4 916 20.6 
El Salvador 5 2.3 21 5.6 51 9.1 80 7.8 104(d) 10.1 
Guatatala 15 5.1 30 7.0 92 13.1 168 12.1 238 16.5 
Guyana ... ... 15(d) 8.6 31(d) 12.2 54(d) 19.4 82(d) 25.5 
Haiti 4 6.8 4(d) 4.8 11(d) 8.8 37(d) 20.3 11(d) 21.0 
Bordwas 14 6.3 26 9.9 63 16.1 77 10.6 113 13.8 
Janalca 27 6.6(d) 64 9.6 175 18.7 230(d) 26.4 280(d) 28.0 
Nlcaragts 11 5.6 23 7.0 59 10.5 89 14.9 80 22.2 
Parana 66 18.5 89 18.2 274 34.3 212 22.5 306 27.7 Paraguay 7 9.2 13 10.7 50 25.3 84 21.9 105 20.0 
Peru 12 2.0 51 5.0 116 5.7 36 1.8 12 0.5 
Daninican Republic 19 6.2 47 9.6 116 15.0 189 18.6 280 22.6 
Uruguay 34 14.6 48 1.6 151 3.0 217 28.2 291 23-7 
Total 742 U ! 1 680 IfliÖ 5JÜ1 1XJ 7 555 20.6 11 856 24.5 
(a) Imports of fuels and lubricants. 
(b) Preliminary figures. 
(c) Including ooal, ccke ar*i briquettes. 
(d) Estimates. 
Table 10 
UTBJ AMERICA: PURCHASING POWER OF EXPORTS OF GOODS ÄND SERVICES 
Latin America Oil-exporting countries Mon=oil=esporting countries 
Index Variation IndeK Variation Index Variation 
1970 100.0 3.3 100.0 =1.8 100.0 4.7 
1971 99.0 -1.0 108.8 8.8 96.5 =3.5 
1972 108.8 9.8 109.4 0.6 108.6 12.6 
1973 132.6 21.9 142.1 29.9 130.2 19.8 
1974 155.4 17.1 258.3 81.8 128.4 -1.3 
1975 131.4 =15.4 183.0 (a) =29.2 (a) 117.9 (b) »8.2 (b) 
1976 142.9 0.8 187.5 168.3 2.4 4.4 131.3 128.6 11.4 12.3 
1977 157.0 9.9 184.4 171.4 =1.6 1.9 149.9 148.9 14.1 15.8 
1978 164.2 4.6 169.6 184.4 =8.0 7.6 162.8 152.7 8.6 2.6 




_ CEPAL, on the basis of official 
s of 1976s including Mexico. 
As of 1976t excluding Mexico. 
Table 28 
LATIN AMERICA: TERMS OF TRADE 
(1970 = 100) 
Latin America 0il~<sx porting countries Bton=oil=exporting countries 
Indes Variation Index Variation Index Variation 
970 100.0 3.3 100.0 -1.7 100.0 4.9 
f71 97.4 -2.6 111.6 11.6 92.9 =7.1 
972 100.3 3.0 108.9 =2.4 97.8 5.2 
973 112.9 12.5 128.8 18.2 108.3 10.8 
974 129.8 15.0 246.9 91.7 100.9 =6.9 
975 113.9 =12.3 232.1 (a) -6.0 (a) 90.5 (b) =10.3 (b) 
976 115.8 1.7 225.1 188.8 =3.0 =0.5 94.4 90.7 4.3 3.9 
977 118.7 2.5 233.2 187.2 3.6 =0.8 100.0 96.0 5.9 5.9 
978 106.9 -10.0 210.4 162.6 =9.8 13.2 92.4 87.5 =7.6 -8.9 
979(e) 111.9 4.7 277.2 203.5 31.8 25.2 90.9 82.4 =1.6 -5.8 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
T5T"~AS of 1976, including Mexico, 
(b) As of 1976, excluding Mexico, 
(e) Preliminary figures. 
Table 10 
LATIN AMEBICA: TRADE BALANCE 
(Millions of dollars) 
Merchandise trade 
Exports of goods FOB Imports of goods FOB balance Wet non-factor services Trade balance 
1977 1978 1979(a) 1977 1978 1979(a) 1977 1978 1979(a) 1977 1978 1979(a) 1977 1978 1979(a: 
Latin America 50 318 54 048 72 155 49 831 55 579 70 263 487 -1 531 1 892 -3 300 -4 383 -5 925 -2 813 -5 914 -4 033 
Oil-exporting countries 18 696 20 118 29 355 19 637 22 768 26 762 -941 -2 650 2 593 -1 064 -1 686 -2 191 -2 005 -4 336 402 
Bolivia 658 641 779 644 790 931 14 -149 -152 -120 -148 -188 -106 -297 -340 
Ecuador 1 401 1 532 2 144 1 361 1 315 1 645 40 217 499 -248 -210 -324 -208 7 175 
Mexico «1 604 6 460 9 423 5 625 7 803 11 636 -1 021 -1 343 -2 213 1 212 1 329 1 296 191 -14 -917 
Trinidad and Tobago 2 372 2 312 2 720 1 667 1 837 1 850 705 475 870 39 -29 -35 744 446 835 
Venezuela 9 661 9 173 14 289 10 340 11 023 10 700 -679 -1 850 3 589 -1 947 -2 628 -2 940 -2 626 -4 478 649 
Won-oil exporting 
countries 31 622 33 930 42 800 30 194 32 811 43 501 1 428 1 119 -701 -2 236 -2 697 -3 734 -808 -1 578 -4 435 
Argentina 5 654 6 407 7 811 3 796 3 508 6 115 1 858 2 899 1 696 " 38 -159 -700 1 896 2 740 996 
Barbados 91 111 149 250 288 374 -159 -177 -225 106 139 163 -53 -38 -62 
Brazil 11 925 12 450 15 244 12 023 13 607 17 961 -98 -1 157 -2 717 -1 580 -1 718 -2 342 -1 678 -2 875 -5 059 
Colombia 2 727 3 221 4 062 1 979 2 753 3 248 748 468 8l4 -79 -106 -99 669 362 715 
Costa Rica 828 858 929 925 1 066 1 271 -97 -208 -342 -70 -85 -110 -167 -293 -452 
Chile 2 180 2 469 3 821 1 967 2 544 3 579 213 -75 242 -381 -425 -532 -168 -500 -290 
El Salvador 972 846 1 134 860 952 957 112 -106 177 -92 -128 -168 20 -234 9 
Guatemala 1 192 1 130 1 197 1 141 1 207 1 491 51 -77 -294 -141 -219 -152 -90 -296 -446 
Guyana 259 296 290 287 254 293 -28 42 -3 -44 -43 -49 -72 -1 -52 
Haiti 138 157 141 200 209 230 -62 -52 -89 -26 -43 -39 -88 -95 -128 
Honduras 530 626 750 550 655 774 -20 -29 -24 -54 -61 -71 -74 -90 -95 
Jamaica 760 773 800 667 751 859 93 22 -59 -43 -29 -35 50 -7 -94 
Nicaragua 636 646 567 704 553 335 -68 93 23 2 -57 -34 -92 -125 59 140 
Panama 287 295 334 792 862 1 105 -505 -567 -771 401 418 514 -104 -149 -257 
Paraguay 324 350 416 360 432 620 -36 -82 -204 -11 -24 -59 -47 -106 -263 
Peru 1 726 1 933 3 474 2 165 1 600 2 091 -439 333 1 383 -113 -11 7 -552 322 1 440 
Dominican Republic 781 676 893 848 860 1 058 -67 -184 -165 -122 -135 -127 -189 -319 -292 
Uruguay 612 686 788 680 710 1 140 -68 -24 -352 32 -34 107 -36 -58 -245 
Source: 1977-1978: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, vol. 30; 1979: CEPAL, on the basis of official data, 
(a) Preliminary figures. 
Table 30 
LATIN AMERICA: BALAKCE 0? PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Trade balance 
Met payments of profits 
and interest 
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•14 761 -11 217 
.1978 1979(a) 1977 
-16 329 -18 317 15 536 
Movsneit of capital 
1978 1979(a) 1977 
22 370 25 460 4 319 
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-808 -1 578 -4 435 -5 824 =7 053 -9 782 -6 292 -8 112 -13 486 9 856 15 440 18 726 3 564 7 328 5 240 
1 896 2 740 996 =578 -711 -1 542 1 351 2 077 -511 366 -119 4 932 1 717 1 958 4 421 
-53 -38 -62 -9 -10 -12 -47 -31 -57 53 54 63 6 23 6 
=1 678 -2 875 -5 059 -3 431 -4 232 -5 438 -5 114 -7 038 -10 450 5 514 10 996 7 590 400 3 958 -2 860 
669 362 715 =273 -260 -244 448 -160 524 138 368 738 586 528 1 262 
-167 =293 -452 -74 -96 -141 -226 -372 , -579 322 347 504 96 =25 -75 
-168 =500 -290 =358 -445 -698 -513 -888 -894 646 1 512 1 942 133 624 1 048 
20 =234 9 -43 -61 -55 8 -249 -, 10 36 284 -118 44 35 -108 
-90 -296 -446 -63 -25 -13 -59 -207 -329 241 275 304 182 68 -25 
-72 
-88 
- 1 -52 -21 -21 -25 -95 -28 -82 89 
81 
56 39 -6 28 -43 
-95 -128 -12 -15 -14 -69 -81 -110 94 126 12 13 16 
-74 -90 -95 
=94 
-69 -86 -106 -138 -170 -192 204 179 207 66 9 15 
50 -7 =138 
-69 
-152 -161 -73 -143 -240 69 59 80 -4 -84 =160 
-125 59 
=149 
140 -94 -56 -192 =33 84 196 -55 -136 4 -88 -52 
-104 -257 -55 -60 -80 -170 -224 -349 163 305 328 -7 81 -21 
-47 -106 -263 -16 -24 -35 -64 -130 -298 171 310 465 107 180 167 
-552 322 1 440 -424 -576 -915 -971 -252 647 1 012 148 925 41 =104 1 572 
-189 -319 -292 -123 -108 -181 -266 -376 -355 275 365 364 9 =11 • 9 
-36 -58 -245 -68 -77 -66 -102 -127 -305 280 262 373 178 135 68 
Source: 1977-1978: International Monetary Fund, Balance of ¡Payments Yearbook, vol. 30; 1979: CEPAL, on tSie basis of official data. 
(a) Preliminary figures. 
(b) Including net private transfer payments. 
Table 10 
LATBJ AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF GROSS INTERNATIONAL RESERVES 
(Millions of dollars) 
i 
At end of year Growth rates 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Latin America 17 «45 22 399 26 974 33 856 40 861 28.4 20.4 25.5 20/T 
Oil-exporting 
countries 10 948 10 976 11 731 10 522 12 400 0.3 6.9 -10.3 17.8 
Bolivia 140 151 211 170 178 7.9 39.7 =19.4 4.7 
Ecuador 270 499 654 670 767 84.8 31.1 2.4 14.5 
Mexico 1 384 1 188 1 649 1 842 2 033 =14.2 38.8 11.7 10.4 
Trinidad and Tobago 751 1 014 1 482 1 805 2 138 35.0 46.2 21.8 18.4 
Venezuela 8 403 8 124 7 735 6 035 7 284 =3.3 -4.8 =22.0 20.7 
Non-oil-exporting 
countries 6 497 11 423 15 243 23 334 28 461 75.8 33.4 53.1 22.0 
Argentina 288 1 445 3 154 4 967 9 388 401.7 118.3 57.3 "§970 
Barbados 40 28 37 60 66 -30.0 32.1 62.2 10.0 
Brazil 3 980 6 488 7 192 11 826 8 966 63.0 10.9 64.4 -24.2 
Colombia 475 1 101 1 747 2 366 3 844 131.8 58.7 35.4 62.5 
Costa Rica 49 95 190 194 119 93.9 . 100.0 2.1 =38.7 
Chile 56 405 427 1 090 1 938 623.2 5.4 155.3 77.8 
El Salvador 107 185 211 268 140 72.9 14.1 27.0 -47.8 
Guatemala 284 491 669 742 696 72.9 36.3 10.9 -6.2 
Guyana 100 27 23 58 18 »73.0 -14.8 152.2 =74.1 
Haiti 12 28 34 39 55 133.3 21.4 14.7 41.0 
Honduras 97 131 180 184 209 35.1 37.4 2.2 13.6 
Jamaica 126 32 48 59 69 -74.6 50.0 22.9 16.9 
nicaragua 122 146 148 51 85(a) 19.7 1.4 =65.5 66.6 
Panana 34 79- .71 150 119 132.4 -10.1 111.3 =20.7 
Paraguay 115 158 268 449 609 37.4 69.6 67.5 35.6 
Peru 426 289 357 390 1 520 -32.2 23.5 9.2 289.7 
Dominican Republic 113 124 180 154 239 9.7 45.2 -14.4 55.2 
Uruguay 73 171 307 287 381 134.2 79.5 -6.5 32.8 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, June 1980. 
(a) At the end of November. 
Table 10 
LATIN AMERICA: VARIATIONS IN CONSUMER PRICES 


























— o o ^ c a c e , . 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
e s a o o e »«•»«.«•««Be — — — — — — — — -
14.4 15.4 24.5 42.2 45.6 72.0 
21.6 39.1 P Ü 2 "$379 "ÇôTT 33C9 
17.7 18.1 14.0 13.7 33.8 31.2 
3.5 14.1 14.0 25.0 26.9 17.9 
34.9 22.1 163.4 508.1 375.9 340.7 
7.8 -0.8 5.6 21.3 20.6 1 1 . 3 
5.7 7.7 4.3 13.8 19.2 24.0 
19.3 35.6 94.7 77.5 107.2 66.8 
2.8 4.8 7.4 15.1 19.9 10.3 
9.2 10.1 10.4 2Î7Ô 36.6 12.3 
3.8 3.3 23.6 34.8 39.0 6.0 
4.3 1.9 6.9 15.9 30.6 20.5 
8.0 6.8 6.9 20.6 21.2 13.2 
1.0 -0.6 5.2 7.9 21.0 15.1 
1.0 0.3 1.1 17.5 27.5 0.8 
2.4 1.4 7.1 15.2 11.6 5.5 
-0.7 • 13.3 7.3 20.8 19.5 19.9 1.4 1.5 6.8 5.1 13.O 7.8 
7.5 5.2 9.3 9.6 20.6 15.7 
1.9 
2.5 1.0 6.7 9.7 16.7 1.4 
2.3 6.3 9.5 14.1 22.0 8.7 
1976 1977 1978 1979 
Republic - 1 . 3 10.6 8.0 r17.2 10.5 16.5 
Trinidad and " 
Tobago 3.3 5.0 8.0 24.4 18.6 13.4 
, 0 
59.9 
Venezuela 3.4 3.0 3.5 5.1 11.6 8 
77.6 49.8 47.5 63.3 
3 W 3 Ï B O 169.8 139.7 
44.8 43.1 38.1 76.0 
25.9 29.3 17.8 29.8 
174.3 63.5 30.3 38.9 
27.2 20.7 16.2 20.0 
44.7 32.4 73.7 66.7 
39.9 57.3 46.0 83.1 
7.7 8.3 10.2 22.0 
3.9 9.9 11.3 16.8 
5.5 10.5 13.5 45.5 
4.4 5.3 8.1 13.2 
13.1 9.8 11.8 9.0 
5.2 14.9 14.6 14.8 
18.9 7.4 9.1 13.7 
9.2 9.0 20.0 15.4< 
-0.1 -1.4 5.5 15.4 
5.6 7.7 5.4 18.9 
8.3 14.1 49.4 18.1 
6.2 10.2 4.3 70.3 
4.8 4.8 5.0 10.0 
3.4 "9-4 16.8 35.7 
.7.0 8.5 1.8 26.2 
12.0 11.4 8.8 19.5 
6.9 8.1 7.0 20.7 
63.9 41.7 40.2 55.2 Latin America 12.2 13.3 21.2 37.0 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, April 1980 and official""" 
data supplied by the countries^ 
(a) Variation November 1978 - November 1979. 
(b) The totals for Latin America and the partial totals for groups of countries correspond to the 
average variations for the countries weighted by their population in 1970. 
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LATIN AtffiRICA: FREES CP IMPORTS At® EXPORTS CP G30IB 
(Growth rates) 
Imports Exports 
197« 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Countries with high inflation 46.2 8.9 4.5 %1 6J 18.9 28.1 -6.9 11.2 M -hi 17.4 
Argentina 46.9 14.1 4.7 12.0 2.6 26.2 28.2 -8.5 -7.3 •2.1 7.7 16.8 
Brazil 52.9 6.8 6.2 2.8 7.0 20.4 30.0 0.3 15.4 11.6 -7.0 10.0 
Colanbia 32.4 10.9 1.1 10.0 9.0 12.9 19.9 -5.8 46.6 59.4 -14.5 -5.0 
Chile 32.5 20.2 2.0 10.9 8.0 22.0 40.0 -27.3 9.5 -0.5 4.9 30.9 
Mexico 30.1 9.0 4.0 3.0 8.0 11.7 42.3 3.3 13.0 10.0 2.0 28.4 
Peru 24.0 12.0 2.0 6.5 8.0 17.0 46.7 -9.8 -0.1 3.1 -4.8 48.7 
Uruguay 85.3 7.5 5.9 10.0 3.0 23.3 -2.2 13.6 1.2 9.2 6.4 21.2 
Countries with moderate 
inflation 38.3 10.9 7.1 7.6 8.2 12.3 116.6 2.8 3.7 12.9 -3.1 28.3 
Barbados 32.7 11.9 3.0 7.0 6.0 15.1 77.1 39.0 -40.0 -0.1 5.0 12.0 
Bolivia 24.3 13.0 4.1 11.0 10.0 19.4 98.4 -10.2 6.3 17.4 11.4 36.0 
Costa Rica 37.0 9.5 -4.9 5.3 5.9 14.0 20.0 13.7 13.1 27.8 -6.7 4.4 
Ectsdor 9.9 10.3 1.7 10.0 4.9 15.1 128.3 -8.6 14.6 19.5 -6.9 45.0 
El Salvador 42.1 10.5 0.5 12.0 5.0 14.0 24.3 2.8 37.6 35.0 -15.0 -3.0 
Guatanala 42.6 12.9 7.3 9.3 7.1 18.0 20.7 11.2 . . 16.0 34.9 -3.5 1.0 
Guyana 40.0 21.5 2.0 6.0 5.0 11.0 87.3 24.5 -16.7 7.5 11.2 2.0 
Haiti 30.0 12.0 7.0 8.0 7.0 11.6 35.8 19.1 38.9 64.1 3.1 2.0 
Honduras 28.1 13.0 8.1 10.9 4.9 7.3 31.3 7.3 17.1 25.0 1.2 7.4 
Jamaica 39.2 13.0 2.9 6.0 7.0 11.1 80.5 33.6 -10.1 6.0 0.0 8.1 
Nicaragia 31.8 15.0 3.4 6.3 10.0 14.6 26.1 -7.1 26.1 41.6 -4.9 2.7 
Panama 52.8 14.9 6.1 5.0 6.0 20.8 58.8 12.5 -16.6 3.0 -4.1 7.2 
Paraguay 47.5 12.5 -4.4 6.8 2.9 18.8 30.1 0.2 -0.3 34.8 -8.9 6.9 
Dominican Republic 27.9 13.0 5.0 - 6.0 8.0 15.0 44.8 58.5 -29.6 10.2 -3.0 14.6 
Trinidad aid Tobago 121.7 11.4 5.0 ' .7.0 6.0 12.0 198.5 9.5 6.0 6.0 0.0 17.9 
Venezuela 24.2 16.0 9.0 "10.2 10.0 7.8 166.7 6.8 6.0 11.4 0.0 47.0 
Latin Anerlca 41.1 9.4 5.4 6.2 7.0 15.0 62.3 -3^9 7.1 9.0 - M 20.3 • - " — — — 
